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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider two employers.
Employer A is a closely held corporation owned and run by the Doe family.
The family is a member of the Mennonite Church, a Christian denomination 
that believes that “[t]he fetus in its earliest stages . . . shares humanity with
those who conceived it.”1F 1 The family operates their national store chain 
“in accordance with their religious beliefs and moral principles.”2 2F 
 1.  Editorial,  Don’t Abort the Truth, MENNONITE (June 2, 2009), https://the
mennonite.org/opinion/dont-abort-truth/ [https://perma.cc/57ZF-FYTH].
2.  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (E.D. 
Pa. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of HHS, 724 F.3d
377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub. nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014). In Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., the plaintiffs owned and operated a closely 
held corporation that manufactured wood products; the plaintiffs were Mennonite Christians.
Id. at 402. As a result of their Mennonite faith, the plaintiffs did not want to contribute in 
any way to the use of abortifacient contraception. Id. at 403. The plaintiffs argued that 
operating their corporation in accordance with their Mennonite faith constituted the 
exercise of religion under the Free Exercise Clause and that being forced to give coverage 
for all FDA-approved contraception burdened their religious beliefs. See id. at 406. 
However, the court noted that neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has decided
whether for-profit, secular corporations owned by a religious family possessed the religious 
rights held by individuals. Id.; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 333 (2010).
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Accordingly, they exclude abortifacient 3 F 3 contraception from the group
health insurance plan they offer to their employees. 4F 4 
Employer B is a nonprofit, nonreligious, and pro-life organization that 
organizes the largest pro-life event in the country each year in Washington, 
DC.  Its mission is to “[e]nd abortion by uniting, educating, and mobilizing 
pro-life people in the public square.”5F 5 And its moral vision is “[a] world 
where the beauty and dignity of every human life are valued and protected.”6F 6 
Correspondingly, Employer B only hires people who oppose all forms of
abortion.7  Additionally, they too choose to exclude abortifacient contraception 7F 
from the group health insurance plan they offer to their employees. 
Consequently, the court ruled against the plaintiffs. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 
917 F. Supp. 2d at 319. But the court’s ruling was reversed in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 
2751. 
 3.  See Karen Swallow Prior, The Pill: Contraceptive or Abortifacient?, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2012/12/the-pill-contraceptive- 
or-abortifacient/266725/ [https://perma.cc/4GD7-7L5B]. 
 4.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765. In Hobby Lobby, Hobby Lobby, a for-profit 
closely held corporation owned and operated by a religious family, refused to completely 
comply with the contraception regulations laid out in Obamacare.  Id. at 2759, 2766.  The 
plaintiffs argued that the regulations violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) because they burdened their religious beliefs.  
Id. at 2766.  In contrast, the Department of Health and Human Services argued that the 
plaintiffs should not have the right to sue because the contraception regulations applied only to 
the corporation and not to the owners as individuals.  Id.  Ultimately, an en banc panel of 
the Tenth Circuit held that corporations were persons for the purposes of RFRA and had 
the same rights under the Free Exercise Clause as individuals do.  See id. at 2751, 2766– 
67. 
 5.  About the March for Life, MARCH FOR LIFE, http://marchforlife.org/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/G7GC-VZM3]. 
 6.  Id. In the United States, abortion represents one of the most politically contentious 
issues in the public sphere. See Anna North, How Abortion Became a Partisan Issue in 
America, VOX (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/4/10/18295513/abortion-2020-
roe-joe-biden-democrats-republicans [https://perma.cc/KC6S-LKXD]. The legal and moral 
controversies surrounding abortion polarize the American people. See id. This polarization not
only reflects society’s conflicting social and moral views but also reflects its conflicting 
views on the interpretation of law.  See id.  In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court stated that
because there is no true consensus regarding when life begins, the word “person” in the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn. 410 U.S. 113, 157–58 (1973). Because
of this, the Court ultimately decided that fetuses do not have the right to life, liberty, and
property guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  In the dissent, Justice Rehnquist 
stated that the majority had acted beyond its judicial powers because it had simply fashioned 
and announced a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers without any reason or authority.
See id. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 7.  See, e.g., March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 123 (D.D.C. 2015). 
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Both organizations believe that life begins at conception. Both organizations 
oppose coverage in their health insurances plan for abortifacient contraception.
Both are either owned and operated by or made up of individuals who oppose 
the use of such contraceptive methods. One bases its opposition on its religious 
faith, the other bases its opposition on its moral beliefs. 
In cases related to the Affordable Care Act’s Contraceptive Mandate, a 
mandate that requires employers to provide contraception to employees, 
courts have upheld religious exemptions for religious organizations from 
the mandate.8F 8 Courts have upheld such exemptions because the Constitution
prohibits government interference with a religious organization’s exercise 
of religion.9F 9 
Additionally, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits 
the government from treating entities that are similarly situated differently
without a rational basis. 10F 10 In the context of conscientious war objectors, 
the Supreme Court has stated, “[i]f an individual deeply and sincerely holds 
beliefs that are purely ethical or moral . . . , those beliefs . . . occupy . . . the
life of that individual ‘a place parallel to that filled by God’ in traditionally
religious persons,” then the individual should be given the same accommodation 
as the religious individual.1F 11 It then seemingly appears that courts would 
afford nonreligious employers the same exemption to the Contraceptive
Mandate as religious employers. But is that actually the case? Does the 
government give both Employer A and Employer B exemptions to the 
Contraceptive Mandate because they have the same views about 
contraception?
The answer is not so clear. Courts are split on whether they should also
give a nonreligious organization like Employer B, which has the same 
views about contraception as a religious organization like Employer A does, 
an exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate.12F 12 
In an effort to remedy the obvious discrepancy, the Trump Administration 
issued a new interim final rule to the Affordable Care Act that included a 
8. See Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017) (codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). The Obama Administration even 
issued religious exemptions to the Contraceptive Mandate for certain employers to help
mitigate the Contraceptive Mandate’s mandatory nature from imposing on employers’ 
religious beliefs. See Garance Franke-Ruta, All the Ways to Get Out of Obamacare, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 27, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/09/all-the-ways-to-get-
out-of-obamacare/280075/ [https://perma.cc/6WE5-NQ8Z].
 9. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565
U.S. 171, 185 (2012).
10. See United States v. Calderon-Segura, 512 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2008). 
11. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (plurality opinion).
12. See, e.g., Real Alts., Inc. v. Sec’y HHS, 867 F.3d 338, 343 (3d Cir. 2017);
March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 125. 
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religious exemption and a moral exemption.13F 13 However, two federal district 
courts issued preliminary injunctions that enjoined the Trump Administration 
from enforcing the moral exemption. 14F 14 And although the preliminary 
injunctions presumably resolved the concern that the moral exemption
would leave women working for certain organizations without coverage
for all FDA approved contraception, an equal protection violation lingers. 
In an attempt to help mitigate the difficulties courts are experiencing 
with the Contraceptive Mandate, this Comment15F 15 proposes a uniform factors
13. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017) 
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147); Moral Exemptions
and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable
Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt.
2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
14. See California v. HHS, 281 F. Supp. 3d 806, 813–14 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d in
part, vacated in part sub nom. California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2018); 
Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 560 (E.D. Pa. 2017), aff’d, Nos. 17-3752, 
18-1253, 19-1129 & 19-1189, 2019 WL 3057657 (3d Cir. July 12, 2019), amended in part 
by Nos. 17-3572, 18-1253, 19-1129 & 19-1189, 2019 WL 3228336 (3d Cir. July 18, 2019) 
(mem.). California and Pennsylvania sought to enjoin enforcement of the interim final
rule because the Trump Administration failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure
Act. HHS, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 821–22; Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 563–64. In 2017, a court in
California and a court in Pennsylvania issued nationwide preliminary injunctions against 
the Trump Administration’s interim final rules. HHS, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 832; Trump, 281
F. Supp. 3d at 585. Those cases were appealed to the Ninth Circuit and Third Circuit,
respectively. See generally Pennsylvania v. President United States, Nos. 17-3752, 18-
1253, 19-1129 & 19-1189, 2019 WL 3057657 (3d Cir. July 12, 2019); Azar, 911 F.3d 558.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the California injunction but limited the scope of the injunction 
to only California, Delaware, Maryland, New York, and Virginia. Azar, 911 F.3d at 584.  
The injunction filed in the Pennsylvania court was originally stayed, but then lifted, by the 
Third Circuit. President United States, 2019 WL 3057657, at *4. The Trump Administration
still issued the final regulations, and they became effective on January 14, 2019. Religious 
Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the 
Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 
29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. 147); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage 
of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 
15, 2018) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). Shortly 
thereafter, a court in Pennsylvania and a court in California issued a second set of injunctions.
Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 798 (E.D. Pa. 2019) aff’d, Nos. 17-3752, 
18-1253, 19-1129, 19-1189, 2019 WL 3057657 (3d Cir. July 18, 2019); California v. HHS, 
351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1271 (N.D. Cal. 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-15150 (9th Cir. Jan.
28, 2019). The injunction issued in Pennsylvania applied nationwide, and the injunction
issued by the court in California only covered thirteen states and the District of Columbia.  
Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 835; HHS, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 1271, 1301. 
15. Addressing the legality of the moral exemption for the Contraceptive Mandate 
involves two major questions: (1) whether the exclusion of a moral exemption for the
783
POST SARAH KIM PAGES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/2019 4:58 PM        
 
 
   
 
   
     
 





    
        
  
 
    
 
   
  
      
   
 
  







     
    
  
    
       
   
test that courts can use in their equal protection analysis to define a deeply
and sincerely held religious belief and determine whether religious and 
nonreligious organizations are similarly situated. To demonstrate the necessity
of a uniform factor test, this Comment starts by providing the history of
the Affordable Care Act and the Contraceptive Mandate and exploring the
religious exemptions created in response to the Contraceptive Mandate in 
Part II. Part III elaborates the current circuit split on the issue by delivering 
an overview of how courts have struggled to apply an equal protection analysis 
for nonreligious organizations in Affordable Care Act cases, specifically
delving into two cases. Part IV analyzes the equal protection issue and argues 
that the exclusion of a moral exemption for the Contraceptive Mandate 
violates the equal protection provision in the Fifth Amendment in light of
three questions: (1) what is the difference between religious and nonreligious
organizations; (2) what does it mean to be similarly situated; and (3) does 
the government have a rational basis in treating religion differently than 
nonreligion. Finally, Part V proposes a factor test that courts can use to help 
them identify a deeply and sincerely held belief. 
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Before discussing the enforceability of a moral exemption to the Affordable 
Care Act, it is important to understand the context that gives rise to the debate
in the first place. At the heart of the issue are the Contraceptive Mandate,
the Institute of Medicine’s Recommendations, and the various religious
exemptions to the Contraceptive Mandate promulgated by the executive 
branch. Consequently, this Part begins by examining the history of the 
Affordable Care Act and the Contraceptive Mandate. It also gives a brief
account of the recommendations responsible for determining what types 
of contraceptive methods the Mandate required employers to cover for their 
employees. Finally, it concludes with an overview of the several religious 
exemptions created by the Obama and Trump administrations to the 
Contraceptive Mandate. 
Contraceptive Mandate violates the equal protection provision in the Fifth Amendment,
and (2) whether the interim final rule issued by the Trump Administration violated the
Administrative Procedure Act and is therefore unauthorized. But, even if the answer to 
the second question is in the affirmative, and courts invalidate the moral exemption, the
first question is still left unanswered. This is a problem because an equal protection violation 
still remains.  Thus, the scope of this Comment will only address the first question.
784
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A. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
Congress signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
into law on March 23, 2010.16F 16 After the ACA’s passage and the Supreme
Court’s ruling in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,17F 17 
the ACA became legally binding. Congress intended the ACA to bring reform
to health insurance by ensuring “affordable and accessible” coverage “for
all Americans.”18F 18  Notably, the ACA required newly issued health insurance
plans to cover preventive and wellness services, including women’s preventive 
services.19F 19 And as of January 1, 2013,20F 20 a majority of health plans guaranteed
16. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1101, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012).  
In 2018, a federal judge in Texas declared the entire ACA as invalid on the basis that once 
Congress repealed the tax penalty, which enforced a mandate that Americans get health
insurance, the whole law became invalid. Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579,
585, 619 (N.D. Tex. 2018). In that case, the plaintiffs argued that because the passage of
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 no longer made the individual mandate a tax, Congress 
no longer had the authority or power to regulate the individual mandate. Id. at 585, 591.  
The judge’s ruling was in direct contrast to Congress’s decision not to strike down the 
ACA in 2017. See Alicia Parlapiano et al., How Each Senator Voted on Obamacare
Repeal Proposals, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/
07/25/us/politics/senate-votes-repeal-obamacare.html [https://perma.cc/R6DU-3UCA].  
Nevertheless, despite the holding in Texas v. United States, the ACA will remain in effect 
as the ruling is appealed. Berkeley Lovelace Jr. & Tucker Higgins, Yes, Obamacare Is
Still the Law of the Land Despite US Court Ruling Striking It Down, CNBC (Dec. 17,
2018, 3:45 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/17/obamacare-still-law-of-land-despite-
us-court-ruling-striking-it-down.html [https://perma.cc/A4YQ-YCB9].
17. 567 U.S. 519, 587–88 (2012). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the 
“individual mandate” of the ACA, which required individuals to purchase and maintain
health insurance and coverage, was constitutional under Congress’s power vested in the
Taxing Clause.  Id. at 588. Under the Articles of Confederation, the national government 
had no power to tax individuals directly. See generally ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of
1781, art. VIII, para. 2. Instead, it could only ask the states to contribute their share of tax
revenue to the national treasury. Id. Learning from the mistakes of the Articles of 
Confederation, the Framers included the Taxing Clause in Article 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  Through the Taxing Clause, Congress has 
the power to collect taxes without first asking for permission from the states. See id.
18. Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERV. ADMIN.
(Sept. 2018), https://www.hrsa.gov/womens-guidelines/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z3LJ- 
M2E4].
19. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713 (2018); What Marketplace Health Insurance Plans 
Cover, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/coverage/what-marketplace-plans-cover/ 
[https://perma.cc/4JFE-REFC].
20. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE IN THE NEW HEALTH
CARE LAW: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2011), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/
pdfs/contraceptive_coverage_faq_11.9.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL86-D6UJ].
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providers cover enrolled women for all preventative care required by the 
Act without additional cost sharing.21F 21 However, the ACA did not specify
what preventative services should have been covered. 2F 22 Instead, Congress 
delegated that decision to the Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA), a subdivision of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS). 23F 23 
B. IOM Recommendations 
To complete the task, the HRSA enlisted the help of the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM), “an arm of the National Academy of Sciences . . . established
‘for the explicit purpose of furnishing advice to the Government.’”24F 24  The
HRSA had the IOM conducted a study to review “what preventive services
[were] important for women’s health and well-being” and therefore “should 
be considered in the development of comprehensive guidelines” for preventive 
services for women.25F 25 After its study, the IOM concluded that the mandate
should cover services like testing for human papillomavirus and counseling
and screening for human immunodeficiency virus.26F 26 However, the most 
contentious recommendation involved contraception: “the committee 
recommends for consideration as a preventive service for women: the full
range of Food and Drug Administration-approved contraceptive methods,
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for women
with reproductive capacity.”27F 27 That recommendation included “abortifacient” 
drugs, a term coined by pro-life groups.28 Such drugs may “prevent a woman
21. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 147.130, 156.130 (2017).
22.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012).
23. Id.
24. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2788 n.3 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (quoting Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 460 n.11 (1989)).
25. See LINDA ROSENSTOCK ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CLINICAL 
PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 21 (2011).
26. Id. at 9. 
27. Id. at 10. 
28. See Prior, supra note 3. According to the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, a group representing approximately 58,000 obstetricians and gynecologists 
across the United States, a pregnancy exists only after implantation is complete. About 
Us, AM. COLLEGE OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, https://www.acog.org/About-ACOG/
About-Us [https://perma.cc/V2C4-656S]; see Rachel Benson Gold, The Implications of 
Defining When a Woman is Pregnant, in GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 7, 7 (2005), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/2/gr080207.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4S9-X5LB]. 
Thus, drugs that act to affect implantation or pre-implantation events conceivably would 
be considered contraceptives, and drugs that act to affect post-implantation events conceivably
would be considered abortifacients. However, some argue that as technology advances, 
the line between abortion and contraception will become blurred because differentiating
between classes of drugs can be, at times, illogical. See Renée C. Wyser-Pratte, Comment,
786
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from releasing eggs” or “prevent sperm from reaching or fertilizing the egg.”29F 29 
Or, in the view of many pro-life groups, the drugs may cause an abortion.30F 30 
The IOM did not see its recommendation that the ACA cover contraception 
as controversial or problematic because “[c]ontraceptive coverage [had]
become standard practice for most private insurance and federally funded
insurance programs.” 3 1F 31 Additionally, at the time it conducted the study, 
“[t]wenty-eight states [had] . . . regulations requiring private insurers to cover 
Protection of RU-486 as Contraception, Emergency Contraception and as an Abortifacient
Under the Law of Contraception, 79 Or. L. Rev. 1121, 1130 (2000). 
29. Cathy Lynn Grossman, What’s Abortifacient? Disputes Over Birth Control Fuel
Obamacare Fight, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
religion/whats-abortifacient-disputes-over-birth-control-fuel-obamacare-fight/2014/01/28/61 
f080be-886a-11e3-a760-a86415d0944d_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1bcb4bb9602d 
[https://perma.cc/BU2H-R7AB]. There is disagreement as to when life begins and whether the
right to personhood guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment can be given to the unborn.
See Mary Ziegler, The Jurisprudence of Uncertainty: Knowledge, Science, and Abortion, 
2018 WIS. L. REV. 317, 324–25. Personhood can be defined and interpreted very differently,
but in the context of abortion, it can be best understood as the presence of certain 
characteristics that grant a legal, ethical, or moral standing. See Brendan (Bo) F. Pons,
Comment, The Law and Philosophy of Personhood: Where Should South Dakota Abortion 
Law Go From Here?, 58 S.D. L. REV. 119, 138–49 (2013) (detailing different past
and present philosophical approaches in defining personhood). In Roe vs. Wade, the Court 
argued that because there is no general consensus on when life begins, the right to personhood
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be given to the unborn. 410 U.S. 113, 
159 (1973). Several pro-choice advocates argue that just because life starts at conception
does not mean the fetus has a right to personhood. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of 
Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 47–48 (1971).  They believe that the right to life only means
the right not be unjustly killed and does not guarantee a fetus personhood. Id. at 57. They 
argue that fetuses do not have the right to use another person’s body and that women have 
their own property rights to their bodies. Id. at 50–52. However, some pro-life advocates 
argue that a mother’s womb is a fetus’s natural home. Francis J. Beckwith, Arguments
from Bodily Rights: A Critical Analysis, in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY: A READER 155, 
165 (Louis P. Pojman & Francis J. Beckwith eds., 1994). They argue that “a newborn has 
a natural claim on her parents to care for her, regardless of whether her parents wanted her.” 
Id.
30. Alexandra Desanctis, Yes, Some Contraceptives Are Abortifacients, NAT’L REV. 
(Nov. 4, 2016, 8:39 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/11/contraception-birth-
control-abortion-abortifacients-ella-plan-b-iud-embryo-life/ [https://perma.cc/JG2Y-ZXPZ].
However, it is not universally agreed upon that certain types of contraception can cause an 
abortion. See Pam Belluck, Abortion Qualms on Morning-After Pill May Be Unfounded, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/health/research/morning- 
after-pills-dont-block-implantation-science-suggests.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/3XA6-E7VS].
31. ROSENSTOCK ET AL., supra note 25, at 108. 
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contraceptives.”32F 32 However, many state statutes exempted employers from
following this particular part of the ACA for religious reasons.3F 33 In contrast,
the IOM’s study failed to consider religion in its recommendations.34F 34 
After the study was complete, the HHS adopted the IOM’s recommendations 
despite the controversy.35F 35 In 2011, the HHS issued guidelines explaining
that the contraceptive services required by the ACA were based on IOM’s 
study,36F 36 and that under statute, employers needed to provide their employees
with all preventative services, including contraception some considered to 
be abortifacients. This became popularly referred to as the Contraceptive
Mandate. 
C. The ACA’s Religious Exemptions 
In the short time after the passage of the ACA, several organizations 
raised concerns that the Contraceptive Mandate forced religious employers
to provide services that were in conflict with their religious beliefs. 37F 37 
Consequently, the HHS promulgated an interim final rule exempting certain 
32. Id.; see also Insurance Coverage for Contraception Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-contraception-state-
laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/XR5C-YKVA] (last updated Feb. 2012) (stating that at least
twenty-six states already required the coverage for any FDA approved contraception).
33. See, e.g., CAL.HEALTH &SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(c) (West 2017) (“Notwithstanding
any other provision of this section, a religious employer may request a health care service 
plan contract without coverage for FDA-approved contraceptive methods that are contrary
to the religious employer’s religious tenets.”). Although California has given religious and
personal exemptions before, it has also eliminated them. Bob Egelko, California’s Mandatory-
Vaccination Law Survives Court Test, S.F. CHRONICLE (July 19, 2018, 9:50 AM), https:// 
www.sfchronicle.com/health/article/California-s-mandatory-vaccination-law-survives-
13047905.php [https://perma.cc/MHB4-XRKL]. In 2016, California’s vaccination law required
children in public and private schools to be vaccinated against contagious diseases like measles
and chickenpox. See id. The law also eliminated any exemption to the vaccination based 
on parents’ personal beliefs. See id. The law only allowed children with doctor certified 
medical exemptions and those who were home schooled to be exempt. Id. A federal court 
refused to issue a preliminary injunction against the law. See id.
34. See generally ROSENSTOCK ET AL., supra note 25, at 1 (failing to mention religion
anywhere in its report).
35. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2017); see also 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713(a)
(1)(iv) (2018); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv) (2018); Women’s Preventive Services
Guidelines, supra note 18. 
36. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,870 (July 2, 2013) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510
& 2590; 45 C.F.R pts. 147 & 156).
37. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg.
46,621, 46,625 (Aug. 3, 2011) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R.
pt. 147). 
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religious employers from providing contraceptive services to their employees 
(First Religious Exemption). 38F 38 
Yet, fearing that the First Religious Exemption did not fully address or 
solve the concern that the Contraceptive Mandate forced certain employers
to provide contraceptive services that were against their religious beliefs, 
the HHS initiated a notice and comment rulemaking procedure.39F 39 At the 
conclusion of this procedure, the HHS promulgated a new final rule (Second 
Religious Exemption).40  The Second Religious Exemption redefined “religious 40F 
employer” to mean “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or
associations of churches.”41F 41 Under this new definition, secular nonprofit 
organizations were unable to qualify for the Second Religious Exemption 
regardless of their beliefs toward certain contraceptives. However, like the 
First Religious Exemption, the Second Religious Exemption was short lived. 
Following the enactment of the Second Religious Exemption, the Supreme
Court ruled on two cases in which the Contraceptive Mandate was at
issue. 42F 42 As a result of those cases, the HHS issued a third set of interim
38. Id. at 46,623. To qualify for the First Religious Exemption, an employer must 
be a religious employer that “(1) [h]as the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; 
(2) primarily employs persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons 
who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization under section 6033(a)(1)
and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Code Section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) and (iii).”  Id.
39. See Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
16,501, 16,503 (Mar. 21, 2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 147). The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes federal agencies to promulgate rules.
See Administrative Procedures Act: Summary, AM. LEG. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, https://www.
alec.org/model-policy/administrative-procedures-act/ [https://perma.cc/EC8D-ZGHV].
Under Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, a federal agency must provide 
public notice of the proposed rule and give the public an opportunity to comment on the 
proposed rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2017). 
40. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
78 Fed. Reg. at 39,873. A qualified organization under the Second Religious Exemption 
had to notify the health insurance issuers or third-party administrators of its health plan of 
its objection, which would then trigger the issuer or administrator’s duty to provide the 
required contraceptive services to the organization’s employees in place of the organization. 
Id. at 39,885. This procedure was referred to as the accommodation process. See id. at
39,870. 
41. Id. at 39,874. 
42. In the first case, the Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the Contraceptive 
Mandate violated the RFRA. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2751
(2014). In Hobby Lobby, the Court narrowly held that applying the Contraceptive Mandate
to a closely held, for-profit organization that had religious objections did in fact violate 
RFRA. See id. at 2785. In the second case, the Court exempted a religious college from 
needing to notify the issuer or administrator of its health plan of its religious objection.  
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final rules (Third Religious Exemption) that complied with the cases’
holdings.43F 43 The HHS finalized the Third Religious Exemption on July 14,
2015.4F 44 The Third Religious Exemption extended the definition of a religious
employer to include closely held, for-profit organizations with religious
objections to contraceptive coverage.45F 45 
1. Trump’s Executive Order and the Fourth Religious Exemption 
But like its predecessors, the Third Religious Exemption’s run was
unsurprisingly short. Nonreligious organizations with moral objections to 
the Contraceptive Mandate began filing lawsuits to challenge the mandate 
because they were not exempt from contraceptive coverage, although they
had the same beliefs about certain contraception as did religious organizations. 
In response, President Trump issued an Executive Order called “Promoting
Free Speech and Religious Liberty” on May 4, 2017.46F 46  The President called
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014).  In Wheaton College, Wheaton 
refused to comply with the Second Religious Exemption because it viewed its sending
notice of its religious objection to the issuer or third-party administrator as being complicit 
in the termination of human life. See Brief for Appellant Wheaton College at 15, Wheaton 
Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2015) (No.14-2396), 2015 WL1517134, at *15– 
16. Ultimately, the Court reasoned that Wheaton did not need to send notice of its objection to
its issuer or third-party administrator because it had already notified the government of its 
objection when it sent the Secretary of HHS a letter stating its religious objections to providing
contraceptive services. See Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807. 
43. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
79 Fed. Reg. 51,092, 51,092, 51,118 (Aug. 27, 2014) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R.
pts. 2510 & 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
44. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 
80 Fed. Reg. 41,318 (July 14, 2015) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510 & 
2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
45. Id. at 41,324. The Third Religious Exemption also changed the accommodation
process so that employers with religious objections to the Contraceptive Mandate could
either notify their objection to the health insurance issuers or third-party administrators 
of its health plan or notify the Secretary of HHS of their religious objection. See Coverage of
Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. at 51,096.
46. Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675 (May 4, 2017). According to 
Article II of the Constitution, the President is in control of the execution and enforcement
of the laws legislated by Congress. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Yet, there is debate and
controversy surrounding the actual nature and scope of executive authority. For example,
in a Supreme Court case involving a president seizing steel plants, the justices offered multiple
opinions on what constituted executive authority. See generally Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The majority, following a formalist perspective,
believed that seizing steel mills was not within the president’s executive power. Id. at 585. 
In contrast, though Justice Frankfurter concurred with the majority, his opinion took more 
of a functionalist perspective and advocated that the court needed to look beyond the 
language of the Constitution and see how the president’s power has been used in the past.
See generally id. at 593–610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The dissent went a step further
and concluded that because the president was able to seize plants before, the president 
790
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for the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of 
the HHS to “consider issuing amended regulations . . . to address conscience- 
based objections to the preventive-care mandate under [the ACA].”47F 47 
As a result, on October 6, 2017, the HHS issued a new interim final rule 
(Fourth Religious Exemption) with the purpose of carrying out President 
Trump’s order.48 Unlike the prior exemptions, the Fourth Religious Exemption 48F 
contains two exemptions to the Contraceptive Mandate. First, the Fourth
Religious Exemption excuses any nonprofit or for-profit entity, whether
closely held or publicly traded, that has sincerely held religious beliefs against 
providing certain contraception from fully complying with the mandate.49F 49 
Second, the moral exemption excuses any nonprofit or for-profit organization 
that is closely held from fully complying with the mandate if the organization’s 
objection to the mandate is based on sincerely held moral convictions. 50F 50 
Unlike the previous exemptions, the Fourth Religious Exemption significantly 
expands the scope of who could opt out of the Contraceptive Mandate and
must have the power to do so again. Id. at 680, 683, 710 (Vinson, J., dissenting). Yet, the
most cited opinion comes not from the majority or the dissent but from Justice Jackson. See
id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson gave the framework for the president’s 
power by laying out three categories. Id. at 635–38. First, the president has powers
conferred from Congress. Id. at 635. Second, the president has concurrent power, which
is power the president does not have but is given by Congress. Id. at 637. And third, the 
president has inherent or enumerated powers from the Constitution.  Id. at 637. 
47. Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21,675, § 3. 
48. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017) 
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). According to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the “[p]ower . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or  in any  
Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  Thus, one scholar has argued
Congress has the constitutional authority to create executive agencies with substantial
autonomy from the president. A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of Administrative 
Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 789 (1987). Therefore, Congress has the power to 
create administrative agencies, which become part of the executive and subject to the executive
power. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 44 (1994). 
49. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,806.
50. See Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838, 47,851 (Oct. 13, 2017)
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). Additionally, the 
Fourth Religious Exemption does not require an employer to notify anyone of its decision 
to take the exemption.  See id. at 47,850, 47,858. In other words, the exemption makes
the accommodation process completely discretionary.
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eliminates the requirement that employers notify anyone of their decision
to take an exemption. This perceptibly generated controversy that the other 
exemptions did not.51F 51 
III. THE MORAL PROBLEM AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Before the Fourth Religious Exemption, nonreligious organizations with 
moral objections to the Contraceptive Mandate were not exempt from 
contraceptive coverage even though they had the same beliefs as religious 
organizations did on opposing certain contraception.52F 52 Mindful of this
discrepancy, nonreligious organizations began filing lawsuits claiming the 
Contraceptive Mandate violated their rights to equal protection.53F 53 Yet, the
results from these lawsuits have varied. 
Currently, the lower courts have been unable to agree on whether the
exclusion of a moral exemption for the Contraceptive Mandate violates 
the equal protection provision in the Fifth Amendment. Further, the lower 
courts currently cannot look to the Supreme Court for an answer because
it has not yet directly addressed the issue. This lack of uniformity is troubling
because it appears that the protection of a nonreligious organization’s right to
equal protection depends on the court the nonreligious organization files 
suit in. 
A brief framework of how courts from two different jurisdictions addressed 
the equal protection issue regarding nonreligious organizations will provide 
insight into two things: (1) the different reasonings and rationale for the
holdings of each case and (2) the reason why courts have been inconsistent 
in their holdings. Consequently, this Part lays out the reasonings and holdings
of two cases involving nonreligious organizations and their rights to equal 
protection under the Contraceptive Mandate. Section III.A will examine the
decision of March for Life v. Burwell from the D.C. Circuit, which held that 
the Contraceptive Mandate violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, while Section III.B will examine the decision of Real Alternatives, 
Inc. v. Secretary HHS from the Third Circuit, which held the exact opposite.
51. It should be noted that there are serious legal issues regarding whether the Fourth
Religious Exemption issued by the Trump Administration violated the Administrative Procedure
Act and is therefore unauthorized. In January 2019, a district court in Pennsylvania held
that the HHS failed to comply with notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures in promulgating
the Fourth Religious Exemption, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 
Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 815–16 (E.D. Pa. 2019), aff’d, Nos. 17-3752, 
18-1253, 19-1129, 19-1189, 2019 WL 3057657 (3d Cir. July 18, 2019). 
52. See generally March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. 2015). 
53. See, e.g., Real Alts., Inc. v. Sec’y HHS, 867 F.3d 338, 345 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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A. March for Life
In March for Life, the plaintiff, the March for Life Education and Defense 
Fund (March for Life), was a nonprofit, nonreligious, and pro-life organization.54F 54 
It only hired individuals who opposed all forms of abortion, including
contraceptive methods that it considered abortifacients.5F 55 March for Life 
provided health insurance to its employees. 56F 56 However, because March 
for Life did not support abortion, it opposed coverage in its health plan for 
contraception it considered abortifacients.57F 57 But because March for Life
was a nonreligious organization, it did not qualify for the religious exemption 
under the Contraceptive Mandate.58F 58 Thus, regardless of March for Life’s views
on contraception, the law legally required it to provide all mandatory 
54. March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 122. 
55. Id. at 123. According to experts, hiring based on an organization’s culture and 
values increases employee retention. Brent Gleeson, The 1 Thing All Great Bosses Think 
About During Job Interviews, INC. (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.inc.com/brent-gleeson/
how-important-is-culture-fit-for-employee-retention.html [https://perma.cc/YUX8-L2RN].
Experts believe that organizations tend to fail when they do not have clear and articulated
values that inform employees the purpose of the organization. Scott MacFarland, Why Should
Companies and Employees Have Shared Values?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 6, 2013), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-macfarland/why-should-companies-and-_b_4225199.html
[https://perma.cc/UUN6-ZH8G]. However, under the law enforced by the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, employers cannot discriminate against potential
employees because of a person’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability,
or genetic information. Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/ [https://perma.cc/G2JB-EYXB].
This means that while organizations like March for Life can express to potential employees 
the organization’s core values, which includes the opposition to certain contraception, it cannot
discriminate against a potential employee for not believing in the organization’s opposition
because of his or her religious belief.
56. March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 123. 
57. Id. According to the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
abortifacients are agents that disturb an embryo in the uterine lining after a viable egg had
fused with viable sperm. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, FACTS ARE 
IMPORTANT: EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION (EC) AND INTRAUTERINE DEVICES (IUDS) ARE 
NOT ABORTIFACIENTS 1 (2014), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Departments/Government-
Relations-and-Outreach/FactsAreImportantEC.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q24-KSED]. There 
is disagreement about whether emergency contraception like Plan B are abortifacients. See 
Sonia Lopez et al., Access to Contraception, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 439, 442–43 (2017). The
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists defines emergency contraception
like Plan B as a drug used after sexual intercourse but before a viable egg had fused with 
viable sperm. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, supra, at 1.
58. March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 123. 
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contraceptive methods. Because providing the contraceptives violated its
members’ moral beliefs, March for Life brought suit against the government. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids legislators
from treating significantly similar entities differently.59F 59 In other words,
the government cannot treat “similarly situated individuals differently
without a rational basis.”60 
March for Life argued that the Contraceptive Mandate violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection because it treated nonreligious
organizations differently than similarly situated employers like religious 
organizations.61F 61 The government argued that March for Life was not similarly 
situated to religious organizations because it was neither religious nor 
a church. 62F 62 The court reasoned, however, that the government applied the
59. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). It should be noted that while the Fourteenth
Amendment clearly has an Equal Protection Clause, the Fifth Amendment does not.  Compare
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, with U.S. CONST. amend. V.  In Brown v. Board of Education, 
the Supreme Court invalidated state and local laws that promoted school segregation as
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 347 U.S. 483, 493–95
(1954). On the same day, the Court, in Bolling v. Sharpe, used the Due Process Clause
under the Fifth Amendment to prohibit segregated schools in the District of Columbia.
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). The Court went on to state that although the Fifth Amendment
did not have an Equal Protection Clause, the concepts of equal protection and due process 
both stem from the American ideal of fairness and thus are not mutually exclusive. Id. at 
499.  Consequently, despite a clearly stated Equal Protection Clause, the Court has assumed in
subsequent cases that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal
protection guarantee. David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and 
Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L. J. 1253, 1255 (2005); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). 
60. Noble v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 194 F.3d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
(citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).  Courts 
do not require the government to produce any evidence or articulate any argument for a 
rational basis review. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1993). Instead, in order
to succeed in a rational basis review, the challenger of law must disprove “every conceivable
basis” for the legislative classification. Id. (citing Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). Yet, in some cases, the Court has applied a broader
application of the standard. For example, in City of Cleburne, the respondent purchased a
building with the intention of leasing it to the Cleburne Living Center (CLC). City of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435. However, the city issued a new ordinance that required a 
special use permit from the CLC because the CLC planned to use the home for individuals 
with disabilities. Id. at 436–37.  The city eventually denied the CLC’s permit.  Id. at 437.  
CLC then sued the city alleging that the ordinance was invalid because it discriminated
against individuals with disabilities. Id.  The Court ultimately overstepped the traditional 
rational basis test and struck down the ordinance because the city was unable to demonstrate
any rational basis for the ordinance. Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
61. March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 125. 
62. Id. at 126. 
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similarly situated analysis incorrectly.63F 63 It stated that the correct question 
in need of answer was whether March for Life was similarly situated in 
terms of “the precise attribute selected for the [exemption].”64F 64 
The court argued that the government exempted religious employers 
from the Contraceptive Mandate because of the “unique relationship between
a house of worship and its employees.”65F 65 According to the court, the HHS 
believed the unique relationship referred to the fact that employees of religious
organizations were less likely than other employees to want contraceptives
covered by their employers.6F 66  Specifically, the HHS stated: 
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 121 (quoting Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating 
to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. 2590; 
45 C.F.R.  pt.  147)).  It has been  argued that  religion can  promote democracy through
communal events such as church going. In his article Bowling Alone: America’s Declining
Social Capital, Robert Putnam argues that social capital—the trust and cooperation that results 
from the relationships formed among individuals in civic organizations and community
groups—is necessary for democracy. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining
Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65 (1995). Putnam argues that social capital, which comes
from activities like church going, creates a more effective government. Id. at 66–67. Putnam 
points to the recent decline of participation in civic associations as one reason for the rise 
in voter apathy. Id. at 67–68. Putnam argues that without social capital, democracy will 
fail because people will not be able to build the trust and tolerance with other people required
for democracy. Id. at 73. His argument goes: democracy needs cooperation, and without 
social capital that comes from activities such as church going, cooperation is not possible.
See id. at 66–67. 
66. March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 126–27. In the United States, religion in the
public sphere represents one of the most contentious issues. See generally KENNETH D.
WALD & ALLISON CALHOUN-BROWN, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (6th
ed. 2011). Some argue that the acceptance of religious groups in the public sphere, especially
in the political arena, threatens the stability of American democracy. See id. at 350.  They
claim that “researchers have found that hostility to blacks, Jews, homosexuals, and other 
minority groups has most often been expressed by adherents of theologically conservative 
churches.” Id. at 350–51. However, there are others that argue that religion in the public
sphere upholds values and beliefs that are necessary to the preservation of democratic values.
Id. at 358. They argue that human rights have been upheld in the United States because
of the religious belief in the “equality of human beings before God.” Id.  They also argue 
that religious values are the foundation for many democratic values: “Love for and the
belief in freedom” comes from the “belief in the sacredness of the individuals as a child of 
God.” Id.
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A group health plan qualifies for the exemption if the plan is established and maintained 
by an employer that primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of 
the [employer] . . . [and] would be less likely to use contraceptives even if
contraceptives were covered under their health plans.67F 67 
This led the court to hold that though the HHS claimed to be protecting 
religious beliefs with the religious exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate,
the HHS was really protecting a moral philosophy about the sanctity of human
life. 68F 68 Accordingly, the court concluded that the HHS was mistaken to
believe that only religious organizations and their employees believed in 
the sanctity of human life. 6 9F 69  In the court’s view, March for Life and its
employees embodied pro-life principles. 70F 70 In fact, its employees refused 
to use what they believed were abortifacient contraception.71F 71 
Consequently, the court held that the Contraceptive Mandate violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment because March for Life
was similarly situated to religious organizations and thus the government
should have afforded it an exemption also.72F 72 In addition, the court concluded
the government did not have a rational basis for denying March for Life an 
exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate and allowing religious organizations 
an exemption.73F 73 It did not agree with the government’s argument that it
had a rational basis to not exempt March for Life solely on the basis that 
religious organizations have historically been given advantages over their 
nonreligious equals. 74F 74 
67. March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 126 (quoting Group Health Plans and Health
Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. 
pg. 54; 29 C.F.R. 2590; 45 C.F.R. 147)). 




72. Id. at 128. 
73. See id. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Supreme Court rejected
a due process challenge to a federal prohibition on interstate shipment of filled milk.  304 
U.S. 144, 147 (1938). In upholding the federal prohibition, the Court created a rational 
basis standard. Id. at 152.  The Court stated that when determining whether a federal law 
violated the Constitution, it would give deference to the legislature unless there was no 
rational basis for the law. Id. In footnote four, the Court infamously stated that it would
only apply stricter scrutiny to laws that on its face appeared to violate a specific provision
of the Constitution, restricted political processes, or discriminated against particular religious 
and racial minorities. Id. at 155 n.4. 
74. March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 127. The Establishment Clause prohibits the
government from establishing a religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Despite the seemingly
clear statement, the Court and scholars have interpreted the clause to mean different things 
over the years. The no aid separationist perspective states that there is a clear wall of separation 
between the church and the state. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History
of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 289–90 (2001). On the other hand, 
796
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B. Real Alternatives
In Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Secretary HHS, the plaintiff was a nonprofit,
nonreligious, and antiabortion organization.75F 75 It provided pregnancy services, 
parenting support, and abstinence education programs to women and families
in various states. 76F 76 Real Alternatives considered the use of contraceptives 
to be morally wrong, so it opposed the use of all contraception.7F 77  Like March
for Life, Real Alternatives only hired employees who shared the organization’s
belief that the use of contraceptives and abortion was morally wrong. 78F 78 
supporters of the nonpreferentialist perspective state that though the Establishment Clause
was not meant to aid religion, the government can aid religion as long it does not favor
one religion over another. See id. at 290. Finally, the proponents of the no jurisdiction
interpretation believe that Framers did not include the Establishment Clause to address the
relationship between government and religion but to address the concerns that the national 
government should have limited powers. Id. at 292. 
75. 867 F.3d 338, 345 (3d Cir. 2017). In 2013, the University of Notre Dame sued
the Obama Administration because the ACA mandated that universities provide contraception 
for their employees. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 912, 914 (N.D. Ind. 
2013), aff’d, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016). Under the
First Religious Exemption, Notre Dame was unable to be exempt from the Contraceptive
Mandate because it did not specifically identify itself as a religious institution that only 
employed members of its own faith. See discussion supra Section II.C. However, under 
the Second Religious Exemption, Notre Dame qualified for the exemption. See discussion
supra Section II.C. Despite its exemption, Notre Dame continued with its lawsuit. In University
of Notre Dame, the university sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of
the Contraceptive Mandate because it objected to the government’s requirement that it fill 
out a form to opt out from compliance with the mandate. Univ. of Notre Dame, 988 F. 
Supp. 2d at 914. By filling out the form, Notre Dame’s health insurer was notified of the
university’s objection and then it itself provided coverage for contraception. Id. at 915. 
Citing Catholic doctrine, Notre Dame refused to permit its health insurer provide the expenses 
for contraception to its employees and students.  Id. Although the government allowed
Notre Dame to opt out of the mandate, Notre Dame argued that its opting out triggered a
third-party’s delivery of contraception, which still violated its right to free exercise of religion. 
See id. However, the district court ultimately held that the government did not violate
Notre Dame’s First Amendment right and did not grant a preliminary injunction. Id. at 935.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 
619 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016).
76. Real Alts., Inc., 867 F.3d at 345. 
77. Id.
78. Id. at 346. In 2018, Iowa lawmakers tried to pass the strictest abortion law in 
the United States at the time. Tony Leys, Iowa ‘Fetal Heartbeat’ Abortion Restriction Declared
Unconstitutional,’  USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2019, 7:44 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2019/01/23/iowa-fetal-heartbeat-abortion-law-ruling/2655252002/ [https://
perma.cc/V5Z8-PA5J]. The law, also known as the heartbeat bill, prohibited abortions 
once a heartbeat is detected. Id. This essentially prevented abortions past the sixth week 
of a woman’s pregnancy. Id. However, in 2019 a state court judge struck down the law 
797
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Thus, before Congress enacted the ACA, Real Alternatives did not provide
contraceptive services to its employees in its health plan.79F 79 However, because
Congress enacted the ACA that contained the Contraceptive Mandate, Real 
Alternatives’ health insurer provided employees with a new health plan 
that covered contraceptive services.80F 80  Additionally, because Real Alternatives
held itself to be a nonreligious organization, the government did not exempt 
it from the Contraceptive Mandate.81F 81 
As a result, Real Alternatives sued the government arguing the Contraceptive 
Mandate violated the Equal Protection Clause in the Fifth Amendment because
the religious exemption only exempted religious organizations and not 
nonreligious organizations that also opposed the Contraceptive Mandate. 82F 82 
The district court rejected Real Alternatives’ argument, and the Third Circuit 
affirmed. 83F 83 
Real Alternatives argued that the government did not have a rational basis 
to exempt religious organizations and not nonreligious organizations. 84F 84 
stating that it violated the Iowa constitution. Id. According to the Iowa Supreme Court in
a previous challenge to an abortion-restriction law, a woman’s decision to get an abortion
is a fundamental right protected by the state’s constitution. Id.
79. Real Alts., Inc., 867 F.3d at 346. 
80. Id.  In Griswold v. Connecticut, Connecticut passed statutes against the use of
contraception. 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). The Court held that the statutes were unconstitutional
because they violated an individual’s right to privacy. Id. at 486. Additionally, the majority
reasoned that it would not follow Lochner v. New York or construe the Fourteenth Amendment
to strike down the statutes. Id. at 481–82. Instead, the majority struck down the statutes
based on an individual’s right of privacy derived from the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 482. In other words, the majority reasoned that there are various guarantees in the 
Constitution that created an individual’s constitutional right to privacy.  In contrast, Justice
Harlan explicitly relied on the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process to hold
that the statutes were unconstitutional. Id. at 499–500 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice 
Harlan specifically believed that there were liberties under the Constitution which due
process incorporated against the states and that were not specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights but still needed to be protected. Id. at 500. 
81. Real Alts., Inc., 867 F.3d at 342. 
82. Id. at 346–47. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court overturned a conviction under 
a law that banned the distribution on contraception. 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972). The Court 
decided that the right of privacy is inherent in a marriage and that the government did not
have the authority to intrude into matter that so fundamentally affected a couple’s decision
to have a child or not. Id. at 443. Additionally, the Court struck down the law on equal protection 
grounds, reasoning that the law’s distinction between single and married people did not 
pass the rational basis test of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Id.
at 447. 
83. Real Alts., Inc., 867 F.3d at 346, 352. 
84. Id. at 348. Professor McGoldrick argues that there is no way to predict what 
cases get the rational basis test. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Rational Basis Test and Why It
Is So Irrational: An Eighty-Year Retrospective, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 792 (2018).  
He advocates for a new test, a “reasonable basis test.” Id. at 799. In applying a reasonable 
basis test, McGoldrick advocates that courts should ask themselves whether there is a legitimate
798
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Specifically, Real Alternatives posited that the government only excluded 
it from the exemption because it was not a religious group or a church. 85F 85 
According to the court, Real Alternatives only had a one-sentence mission
statement that stated its opposition to abortion and did not claim that it
“play[ed] the same role in its members’ lives as religious methods and values 
play in the lives of adherents.”86F 86 In order for a nonreligious organization to 
be similarly situated to a religious organization exempted under the 
Contraceptive Mandate, the nonreligious organization needed to be a
“comprehensive belief system.”87F 87 The court did not believe Real Alternatives’ 
one-sentence mission statement amounted to a “comprehensive belief 
system.”8F 88  Therefore, the court concluded that Real Alternatives was not
similarly situated to religious organizations.89F 89 
The court also stated that even if Real Alternatives was similarly situated 
to religious organizations, its equal protection violation claim still would 
have failed because the government had a rational basis for exempting religious
organizations and not nonreligious organizations.90F 90 According to the court,
purpose for a law and then ensure that the law advances that purpose. Id. at 800. He further
argues that such a test is so easy to apply it would go unnoticed when applied. See id.
85. Real Alts., Inc., 867 F.3d at 348. 
86. Id. at 349 (quoting Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d
869, 871 (7th Cir. 2014)). In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
the Court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade and upheld three of the five statutes that regulated abortions. 
505 U.S. 833, 846, 900–01 (1992) (plurality opinion). The four statutes required a twenty-
four hour waiting period, parental consent, husband notification, and hospital reporting
before a woman decided to get an abortion. Id. at 900–01. In striking down the down the
statutes, the Court used a new standard: it asked itself if the statutes imposed an undue 
burden on an individual’s right. Id. According to the new standard, the Court would uphold
the law unless the law placed a substantial burden on an individual. Id. In the case of abortion, 
the Court held that it would uphold any statute restricting abortion unless the statute put a
substantial burden on a woman seeking an abortion. Id.
87. Real Alts., Inc., 867 F.3d at 349. 
88. Id. In Africa v. Pennsylvania, Frank Africa, a self-proclaimed “Naturalist Minister”
for the MOVE organization, argued that the state government was required to provide him 
with a special diet of raw foods while he was in prison because of his religion, MOVE. 
662 F.2d 1025, 1025 (3d Cir. 1981). According to Africa, MOVE was a religion even though
the organization did not practice any ceremonies or rituals. Id. at 1027. Nonetheless, the 
Third Circuit held that MOVE was not religion and therefore not protected by the First
Amendment’s religion clauses because it focused on secular matters rather than religious 
ones and lacked the structural features of a traditional religion. Id. at 1036. However, the
court was careful to include that it did not believe that Africa lacked sincerely held beliefs.
Id.
89. Real Alts., Inc., 867 F.3d at 349–50. 
90. Id. at 351. 
799
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the old practice of recognizing religious autonomy justified the different
treatment.91F 91 Thus, the court held that there was no equal protection violation.92F 92 
Although confronted with the same issue, the two courts reached different 
conclusions. In March for Life, the court stated that the government exempted 
religious employers from the Contraceptive Mandate because employees
of religious organization were less likely than other employees to want
contraceptives covered by their employers, and therefore the religious 
exemption was actually protecting a moral philosophy about the sanctity 
of human life. 93F 93 Thus, the court held that a nonreligious organization is
similarly situated to a religious organization if it has the same views about 
human life as a religious organization exempted from the Contraceptive 
Mandate. 94F 94 Additionally, the court concluded that the government did not
have a rational basis for denying nonreligious organizations an exemption.95F 95 
In contrast, in Real Alternatives, the court held that a nonreligious organization 
is not similarly situated to a religious organization exempted from the 
Contraceptive Mandate if it is not a comprehensive belief system.96F 96  Unlike
the court in March for Life, the court in Real Alternatives found it necessary 
that a nonreligious organization be a comprehensive belief system to be 
similarly situated to a religious organization. 97F 97 Additionally, the court 
concluded that the government has a rational basis for exempting religious 
organizations and not nonreligious organizations.98F 98 
Accordingly, answering whether the exclusion of a moral exemption
for the Contraceptive Mandate violates the equal protection provision in
the Fifth Amendment involves analyzing and answering the three questions 
posed in the cases above.  First, what is the difference between religion and 
nonreligion? Second, what does it mean to be similarly situated?  Lastly,
does the government have a rational basis in treating religion differently
than nonreligion? 
91. Id.
92. See id. at 352. 
93. March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 127 (D.D.C. 2015).
94. Id. at 128. 
95. Id.
96. Real Alts., Inc., 867 F.3d at 349–50. 
97. Id.
98. Id. at 351. 
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The ACA Should Include a Moral Exemption 
to the Contraceptive Mandate 
Courts should and must protect nonreligious organizations’ rights to 
exempt themselves from the Contraceptive Mandate, even if it goes against 
popular belief.  Although the unfortunate effect of this protection will inhibit 
the ability of women working for nonreligious organizations that oppose 
the use of certain contraceptive methods from receiving certain contraception 
through their employers, there are ultimately two impositions of indignity
here: the potential affront to women who are denied certain contraception 
from their employers, and the affront to nonreligious employers who are 
told their rights are not as important as those of religious employers. 
Despite the benefits of covering all forms of contraception for women, the
government should not be able to discriminate against certain groups in 
the process.
The exclusion of a moral exemption for the Contraceptive Mandate violates 
the equal protection provision in the Fifth Amendment for three reasons.
First, legislation and courts should not treat religious organizations differently
than nonreligious organizations because there is evidence that the protection 
of religion serves as proxy that also protects nonreligious interests.
Additionally, prominent court cases seem to suggest that the Supreme Court 
recognizes such a proxy. Second, nonreligious organizations are similarly
situated to religious organizations when it comes to the exemption to
the Contraceptive Mandate because the HHS’s stated purpose in creating 
a religious exemption justifies the extension of such an exemption to 
nonreligious organizations, and the underlying reasons justifying the protection
of religious beliefs also justify the protection of nonreligious beliefs. Third, 
the HHS does not have a rational basis in treating religious organizations 
differently from nonreligious organizations because the HHS’s own statements 
regarding the purpose of the religious exemption negates any conceivable 
reason for dissimilar treatment. 
1. Religion v. Nonreligion 
The First Amendment provides special rules regarding religion. It expressly 
prohibits the establishment of religion and guarantees the free exercise of 
801
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religion.9F 99 The Supreme Court has stated “[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion
are protected by the Free Exercise Clause.” 10F 100 Additionally, the Court has
made clear that under the Establishment Clause, the government cannot pass
laws that aid one religion and not another or prefer one religion over another.01F 101 
Yet, the Constitution does not define religion, and the Supreme Court has
never given a specific definition of religion.102F 102 This affects the Contraceptive
Mandate because what constitutes religion affects whether a nonreligious
organization that opposes providing certain contraceptive services for the
same reason a religious organization opposes providing them is exempt.
Courts are breaching their duty to protect nonreligious organizations’ 
rights to equal protection when it comes to the Contraceptive Mandate. First, 
there are strong arguments that suggest the protection of religion serves 
as a proxy to protect nonreligious interests. This is especially relevant in 
furthering the position that the ACA should include a moral exemption to
the Contraceptive Mandate. Additionally, there is evidence that such a proxy
is consistent with the law because the Supreme Court has previously granted
conscience-based objections under a statute that was only meant to protect
religious objectors. Consequently, the Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Secretary
HHS court violated an organization’s right to equal protection because it
did not follow Supreme Court precedent that has prohibited distinctions 
between religious and secular beliefs that hold the same place in individuals’ 
lives. 
99. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). There are prominent religious figures
who believe that the founding fathers intentionally shaped the government influenced by
Christian morals. See JERRY FALWELL, LISTEN, AMERICA! 16, 21 (1980). They believe 
that the government should intertwine Christian morals into the political atmosphere to
ultimately guard and encourage the role of Christianity in society. See id. at 16–19. Jerry
Falwell, a pastor and conservative activist, argued that though the founding fathers had
constructed a law separating the church and the state, they never intended for the American 
public to completely exclude God from the government. See id. at 20–22. Falwell argued
that God gave the American people certain unalienable rights in exchange for society’s
obedience, and so society has the duty to promote Christian ideals throughout government. 
See id.
100. Thomas v. Rev. Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) (first citing Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963); and then citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972)).
101. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947). Additionally, it has been debated
and argued that while the Establishment Clause prohibits the establishment of religion,
“[i]t does not prohibit the establishment of nonreligious ethical or moral views.” Micah 
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1352–53 (2012). 
102. See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (stating that defining what constitutes as a
religious belief is “more often than not a difficult and delicate task”). See generally Ben
Clements, Note, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 532 (1989). 
802
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a. Religion Is Not Special
There has long been a debate among legal scholars about whether religion
is special. 103F 103 There is scholarship arguing it is,104F 104 and there is scholarship 
arguing it is not.105F 105 Laying out the arguments for each side deserves an entirely 
separate paper. Thus, this Comment will only briefly lay out two arguments
made by two professors relevant in helping further the argument that the 
ACA should include a moral exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate.
Professor Andrew Koppelman has suggested that the freedom of religion
and religious exemptions are in actuality just proxies that act as forms of
protection for, not only religious interests, but also for many interests that
include nonreligious interests. 106F 106 In so doing, Koppelman concedes that
there is nothing that makes religion particularly special; however, he still
endorses the status quo of giving religion special treatment.107F 107 He states
that American legal tradition gives religion preferential treatment because
103. Schwartzman, supra note 101, at 1427. 
104. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 572 (1998); 
Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion 
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 78 (1990); 
William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal
Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 
193, 193 (2000). 
105. See, e.g., Anthony Ellis, What Is Special About Religion?, 25 LAW & PHIL. 219, 
238 (2006); Gedicks, supra note 104, at 572–74; Marshall, supra note 104, at 202–07. Many 
scholars argue that religious freedom is different from protecting freedom of conscience
because the founding founders believed that religion deserved special constitutional treatment
and that religion is a “unique source of individual and personal identity for many” that 
involves carrying out a duty owed to the creator. John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, “Come
Now Let Us Reason Together”: Restoring Religious Freedom in America and Abroad, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 444–45 (2016) (citing James Madison, Article on Religion Adopted
by Convention, [12 June 1776], in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 175 (William T.
Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1962)). 
106. Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness: A Response to Micah
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U Chi L Rev 1351 (2011), 79 U. CHI.
L. REV. 71, 75 (2013). 
107. See Andrew Koppelman, “Religion” as a Bundle of Legal Proxies: Reply to
Micah Schwartzman, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1079, 1079 (2014); see also Davis v. Beason, 
133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The
Establishment Clause prohibits the government from establishing a religion.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. I.  According to the Lemon Test, the government can only assist religion if the primary
purpose of the assistance is secular, the assistance neither promotes nor inhibits religion, 
and there is no excessive entanglement between the church and state. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
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freedom of religion and religious exemptions protect important religious
interests that cannot be protected with some other justification. 108F 108 
Professor Micah Schwartzman, on the other hand, argues that giving
religion special preference will lead to substantial disparities. 109F 109 In doing 
so, Schwartzman takes Koppelman’s argument a step further and proposes
the creation of a second proxy that would catch interests that fell through
the cracks of the first proxy. 10F 110 In other words, Schwartzman advocates
the protection of nonreligious interests through a second proxy. 
If Koppelman and Schwartzman’s arguments are combined, there is a
strong argument to be made that the ACA should include a moral exemption 
to the Contraceptive Mandate. If it is true that freedom of religion and religious 
exemptions are just proxies that act as protection for many interests, including
nonreligious interests, then courts should be able to accommodate both religious
and nonreligious organizations in cases involving the Contraceptive 
Mandate. However, in order for courts to apply that type of framework, there 
must evidence the framework is consistent with the law. Accordingly, an 
important question to answer is whether there is evidence that a proxy type 
of framework is consistent with law. 1F 111  This Comment argues that the
framework of giving accommodations to both religious and nonreligious
beliefs can be derived from Supreme Court precedent and is thus consistent 
with the law. 
1. Providing Identical Accommodations to Both Religious and 
Nonreligious Organizations 
Despite Congress’s early attempt to require religion to include belief in 
a Supreme Being, its efforts eventually fizzled, and the Supreme Court, through
two prominent cases, rendered the definition of Supreme Being meaningless.
The 1917 Draft Act exempted members of churches historically categorized
as peace churches from participating in war. 12F 112 The exemption for peace
churches did not extend to conscientious objectors.13F 113  In the early 1930s, 
the Supreme Court indicated that it was up to the legislature to decide 
108. See Koppelman, supra note 107, at 1079. 
109. Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085,
1091 (2014).
110. See id. at 1093. Schwartzman also once supported expanding the definition of
“religious” to include secular and moral beliefs if they are comparable to their religious 
counterparts. Id. 
111. See generally Jonathan P. Kuhn, Note, The Religious Difference: Equal Protection 
and the Accommodation of (Non)-Religion, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 191 (2016).
112. See Selective Service Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-12, 40 Stat. 76; T. Oscar Smith
& Derrick A. Bell, The Conscientious-Objector Program—A Search for Sincerity, 19 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 695, 708 (1958).
113. Smith & Bell, supra 112, at 708. 
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whether any exemption for conscientious objectors should exist because
the Free Exercise Clause did not provide a right to such an exemption.14F 114 
Therefore, conscientious objectors were only afforded an exemption if 
Congress chose to relieve the objectors of the imposition.
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1940,
which broadened the exemption to include members of religious institutions
that were not historically defined as peace churches but not so far as to 
include organizations or individuals who objected for nonreligious or moral 
beliefs.15F 115 Then, in 1948, Congress attempted to define religion in the Selective
Service Act. 16F 116 Congress revised the Act to define religion in terms of a
belief in and duties toward a Supreme Being by stating that an objector to 
war may be exempt if his objection was related to his “belief in a relation 
to a Supreme Being [that involved] duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”17F 117  However, the
phrase “Supreme Being” was essentially rendered meaningless by United
States v. Seeger and United States v. Welsh and was eliminated by Congress
in 1967.18F 118 
In Seeger, three individuals, who espoused beliefs outside the traditional
religious model, sought to be exempt under Section 6(j) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act.19F 119 The Universal Military Training and Service Act
exempted individuals “by reason of religious training and belief” and defined
that phrase as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation . . . but [not including 
114. See Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934); United
States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623 (1931), overruled in part by Girouard v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). Up until the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court 
believed religion only referred to an individual’s relationship to “his Creator” and to the
obligations it imposed on him as a result of his obedience to his creator. Davis v. Beason, 
133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
115. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-783, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 
885, 889. 
116. See Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. 80-759, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 613 (codified
as amended 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1948)).
117. Id. According to the Third Circuit, “programs or positions that entangle the 
government with issues . . . that might be classified as ‘ultimate concerns’” do not establish a
religion.  Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212 (3d Cir. 1979). 
118. See Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 6(j), 81 Stat.
100, 104 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 456(j) (1967)).
119. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166, 168–69 (1965). 
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a] . . . personal moral code.”120F 120 The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality
of the statute’s requirement that their objection be based on religious training
and belief, specifically taking issue with the statute’s definition of religious
training and belief. 
Although the Court did not address the constitutionality of the statute,
it interpreted and ultimately expanded the statute to include the plaintiffs 
even though they did not have religious objections.21F 121  The Court posited
that Congress intentionally used the phrase Supreme Being instead of “God”
because it did not want to limit or constrain what it meant to have a religious
belief.122 The Court further explained that “[t]he validity of what [an applicant 
for the exemption] believes cannot be questioned.” 123F 123 Instead, the “task 
is to decide whether the beliefs professed by [the applicant] are sincerely
held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.” 124F 124 
Accordingly, the Court held that individuals who had a belief that was 
sincere and occupied a place in their life that was similar to that filled by
the belief in a Supreme Being qualified for the exemption just like the 
individuals who professed a belief in a Supreme Being.125F 125 
In Welsh v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted Seeger even more
broadly.126F 126 Although the legislature amended the conscientious objection
statute in 1967 after the Seeger decision to eliminate the phrase Supreme
Being,127F 127 and the Court decided this case in 1970, the statute containing the 
phrase Supreme Being was still in effect at the time the plaintiff first applied 
for the exemption. The plaintiff objected to military service for nonreligious 
120. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958); see Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165. 
121. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 163.
122. Id. at 175–76. Scholars have argued that the “[F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause should
apply to beliefs and practices that are ‘arguably religious’ whereas the [E]stablishment [C]lause 
should not apply to beliefs and practices that are ‘arguably nonreligious.’” Mary Harter Mitchell, 
Secularism in Public Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L. REV. 603, 651 n.229 
(1987).  However, there are other scholars that disagree that under the Constitution, religion 
does not have two definitions. In Everson v. Board of Education, Justice Rutledge stated: 
“‘Religion’ appears only once in the Amendment.  But the word governs two prohibitions and 
governs them alike.  It does not have two meanings, one narrow to forbid ‘an establishment’ 
and another, much broader, for securing ‘the free exercise thereof.’”  330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
123. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 165–66. In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335, 341–44 (1970)
(plurality opinion), a plurality of the Court extended Seeger. 
126. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341–44 (plurality opinion).
127. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 6(j), 81 Stat. 100,
104 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1967)); see also Welsh, 398 U.S. at 
336 nn.2–3 (plurality opinion). 
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reasons.128 Nevertheless, the lower court denied the plaintiff’s objection128F
because it was nonreligious. 129F 129 
However, the Court overturned the lower court’s denial of a nonreligious
exemption, reasoning that the exemption applies to “all those whose consciences,
spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them 
no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument
of war.” 130F 130 Consequently, the plaintiff was entitled to the same exemption 
as provided in Seeger. 31F 131 
In Seeger  and Welsh, the Court accommodated both religious and 
nonreligious objectors under a statute that was superficially only meant to
protect religious objectors. Although the Selective Service Act required 
a belief in a Supreme Being, the Supreme Court did not interpret that to 
mean only objectors who based their objection in a belief in a higher being 
were exempt. Instead, the Court interpreted the statute to include objectors
who had a belief that was sincere and occupied a place in their life that was
similar to one filled by the belief in a Supreme Being. Had the Court found 
it absolutely necessary to treat religion specially, it would not have interpreted 
the Selective Service Act to include objectors who based their objections 
on nonreligious grounds. This bolsters the argument that religious exemptions 
are just proxies that act as protection for many interests, including nonreligious 
128. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335–38 (plurality opinion).
129. Id. at 335. A conscientious objection is a “firm, fixed, and sincere objection to 
participation in war in any form . . . because of religious training and/or belief.” DEP’T OF
DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1300.06 § 3.1, at 2 (2007), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did= 
474921 [https://perma.cc/DX6M-8V3M]. 
[I]n order to qualify as a conscientious objector, the applicant must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he or she is “conscientiously opposed to war
in any form,” that his or her “opposition is grounded in religious training and
beliefs,” and that his or her “position is firm, fixed, sincere, and deeply held.”
Jonah Beckley, Comment, Military Law-Army Denies Conscientious-Objector Status Without 
Basis in Fact-Hanna v. Secretary of the Army, 513 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2008), 42 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 419, 421 (2009) (quoting DEP’T OF DEF., supra, § 5.1, at 4).
130. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 344 (plurality opinion). 
131. Id. at 343. In Sherbert vs. Verner, the Supreme Court gave a religious exemption 
from a general law for first time.  374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).  In that case, the Court allowed 
Seventh Day Adventists to collect unemployment benefits even though they did not work 
on Saturdays as conditioned by the law. Id. at 399–402. According to the Court, if a 
general law imposes a burden on an individual’s religion, the law can be objected to unless 
the government has a compelling interest.  See id. at 406.  The Court gave a second religious 
exemption in Wisconsin v. Yoder, where it allowed an Amish community’s children to be 
exempted from a law that require compulsory school attendance.  406 U.S. 205, 207, 234 
(1972). 
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interests. Consequently, courts should be able to give identical accommodations
to both religious and nonreligious organizations in cases involving the 
Contraceptive Mandate. 
a. Real Alternatives Does Not Follow Seeger and Welsh
While March for Life Does 
Thus, in cases related to the Contraceptive Mandate, if courts were 
to incorporate the approach adopted by a plurality of the Supreme Court 
in Welsh, then a nonreligious organization’s claim can be considered
“religious” if it is based on “moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what 
is right and wrong,” and those beliefs are “held with the strength of traditional 
religious convictions.”132F 132 This means that moral beliefs that occupy the life of
an individual parallel to those filled by God are legally equivalent to religious
beliefs traditionally recognized by exemptions.
This directly affects the decision in Real Alternatives. Real Alternatives 
considered the use of contraceptives to be morally wrong, so it opposed the
use of all contraception.13F 133  Thus, it only hired employees who shared the
organization’s belief that the use of contraceptives and abortion was morally
wrong.134F 134 Additionally, because Real Alternatives held itself to be a nonreligious 
organization, it could not use the religious exemption under the Contraceptive
Mandate.135F 135 Although Real Alternatives proclaimed to have a sincerely held 
moral belief , the court ignored the Welsh and Seeger decisions and held that
Real Alternatives could not be exempted.136F 136 
In contrast, the court in March for Life v. Burwell followed the decision
in Welsh and Seeger to find that a nonreligious organization with sincerely
held pro-life beliefs could be exempted from the Contraceptive Mandate.137F 137 
Unlike the Court in Real Alternatives, the March for Life court held that 
the government cannot give advantages to religious organizations and not
to their nonreligious equals solely because it has historically done so. 138F 138 
In effect, the court’s ruling followed precedent and embodied the principles
set forth in Welsh and Seeger. The court used precedent from Welsh and 
Seeger to expand the legal definition of “religious” to include secular, but 
132. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339–40 (plurality opinion). 
133. Real Alts., Inc. v. Sec’y HHS, 867 F.3d 338, 345–46 (3d Cir. 2017).
134. Id. at 346. 
135. The suit was filed prior to the new interim final rules issued by the HHS and
other agencies that include a moral exemption to the ACA’s Contraceptive Mandate.  See 
Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventative Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 26 C.F.R. 
54; 29 C.F.R. 2590; 45 C.F.R. 147).
136. Real Alts., Inc., 867 F.3d at 349–53. 
137. March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 127–28 (D.D.C. 2015).
138. Id. at 127. 
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nevertheless deeply held, ethical and moral beliefs, which resulted in giving
equal treatment to a nonreligious organization.139F 139 
2. The Supreme Court Has Prohibited Distinctions Between
Religious and Secular Beliefs that Hold the Same 
Place in Individuals’ Lives 
The Supreme Court has prohibited differences in treatment between 
religious beliefs and secular beliefs that hold the same place in individuals’ 
lives; 140F 140 this prohibition supports the argument that religious exemptions 
are just proxies that act as protection for many interests, including nonreligious
interests. Requiring a nonreligious organization to be associated with a
church or some type of house of worship or qualify as a religious organization 
per the tax code to be exempt from the Contraceptive Mandate does not align
with precedent. Many nonreligious organizations are “religious” enough
for the government to give them the same treatment as religious organizations.
In Torcaso v. Watkins, the Maryland legislature appointed Torcaso to 
the office of notary public but later denied his commission because he would
not proclaim a belief in God as required by Maryland’s Constitution.41F 141 
Torcaso claimed that the requirement violated his right to freedom of
religion because he did not believe in the existence of God and did not want
to proclaim such a belief.142F 142 Although the Maryland courts disagreed with
Torasco, the Supreme Court held that government could not give preferential
treatment to religions that acknowledged the existence of God over religions
that did not.143F 143 
Unlike the Court in Torasco, the court in Real Alternatives treated religious
and secular beliefs that hold the same place in individuals’ lives differently
in the context of the Contraceptive Mandate. In the court’s view, Real 
Alternatives  did  not  “play  the  same role in its members’ lives as religious
methods and values play in the lives of adherents.”14F 144 Specifically, the court
139. See id.
140. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965).
141.  367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961).
142.  See id. 
143. See id. at 495. 
144. Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 871 (7th Cir. 
2014). In this case, Center for Inquiry, a self-proclaimed secular and humanist organization, 
claimed that an Indiana law that required marriage licenses to be only signed by clergy,
judges, mayors, or local government clerks violated the Constitution. Id. at 871. It argued
that the law created a preference for religion over nonreligion. See id.  Center for Inquiry
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took issue with the fact that Real Alternative’s main purpose was to help
implement programs that reflected its opposition to contraceptives and
abortion.145F 145 The court reasoned that in order for the government to treat 
a nonreligious organization like Real Alternatives the same as a religious 
organization, it had to resemble a “religion in everything except belief in 
a deity.”146F 146 The court further reasoned that the implementation of programs 
reflecting a certain belief did not qualify as resembling a religion. 147F 147  This
imposes a stricter standard on a nonreligious organization desiring to claim 
the same exemption given to a religious organization.148F 148 
To claim an exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate, a religious
organization need not prove that, as an individual organization, it actually
resembles a religion. In fact, it only needs to be one of the types of organizations
the exemption covers and hold a sincerely held religious belief against
contraception.149F 149 Additionally, if the court’s requirement from Real Alternatives
were applied to both religious and nonreligious organizations, this would 
preclude many religious organizations from claiming an exemption to the 
Contraceptive Mandate. Take for instance Salvation Army. 
Salvation Army is a religious organization that implements programs to
address the needs of different groups.150F 150 One program provides shelter for
transgender people who are homeless, 51F 151 and another program educates 
first responders and the public about what to do in a natural disaster. 152F 152  In
also argued that its practices and beliefs played the same role in its members’ lives as did
religious practices and beliefs in the lives of religious individuals. Id. However, the district
court did not agree. Id. at 872. The court reasoned that because marriage has religious roots,
the government is able to regulate marriage as a religious accommodation. Id.  Subsequently, 
the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s holding because a religious accommodation 
cannot treat religion more preferably when nonreligious organizations are similarly situated in
relation to the reason why the accommodation was created in the first place. Id. at 872– 
73.  According to Seventh Circuit, the accommodation needed to be neutral. Id.
145. Real Alts., Inc. v. Sec’y HHS, 867 F.3d 338, 349 (3d Cir. 2017). 
146. Id. (quoting Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 872).
147. See id.
148. See Eugene Volokh, Religious Exemptions–A Guide for the Confused, WASH.
POST (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/
03/24/religious-exemptions-a-guide-for-the-confused/?utm_term=.75c95f1deed1 [https:// 
perma.cc/9QWX-7TV2].
149. Katie Keith, Religious, Moral Exemptions From Contraceptive Coverage Mandates:
Second Verse, Same As The First, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.health
affairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20181109.87594/full/ [https://perma.cc/MT37-VE5K].
150. See About Us, SALVATION ARMY, https://www.salvationarmy.org/ihq/about [https://
perma.cc/CUU3-HLJZ]. 
151. The LGBTQ Community and The Salvation Army, SALVATION ARMY, https://
www.salvationarmyusa.org/usn/the-lgtbq-community-and-the-salvation-army/ [https://
perma.cc/BY5C-A3WE].
152. After The Unspeakable, We Speak Hope., SALVATION ARMY, https://www.salvation 
armyusa.org/usn/help-disaster-survivors/ [https://perma.cc/9V2X-MJVA].
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addition, it opposes abortion.153F 153 Yet, despite Salvation Army’s obvious
religious convictions, if the Real Alternatives court’s reasoning was applied
to religious organizations, it would not be able to claim an exemption to
the Contraceptive Mandate because Salvation Army does not resemble a 
religion. Salvation Army’s main purpose is the implementation of programs. 
It does not have buildings dedicated to worship; its own pastors or priests;
or its own set of religious rules, teachings, and interpretation.154F 154  The organization
was not created for the purposes of replacing or even resembling religion
in an individual’s life. However, if the reasoning from the Real Alternatives
court applied, it would need to. This departs from Supreme Court precedent. 
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., two for-profit companies owned
by a single family sued the government objecting to the Contraceptive
Mandate.15F 155  The for-profit companies did not satisfy the ACA’s definition
of a religious employer at the time of the lawsuit, so they could not claim
the religious exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate.156F 156 The government
specifically argued that it did not afford the two companies the religious 
exemption because the companies could not exercise religion.157F 157 However,
the Court found the government’s argument unpersuasive.158F 158 
The Court first reasoned that the companies’ corporate form did not prevent
for-profit companies from exercising religion.159F 159 Like the nonprofit corporations
the government gave the exemption to, for-profit companies that furthered
their own religious beliefs also furthered the religious beliefs of individuals.160F 160 
The government also argued that having a profit-making objective disqualified
for-profit organizations from being able to exercise religion.61F 161  However,
the Court held that having a profit-making objective did not necessarily
disqualify for-profit organizations from proving they could participate in
the exercise of religion because the exercise of religion included physical 
153. Abortion, SALVATION ARMY, http://www1.salvationarmy.org/IHQ/www_ihq_isjc.nsf/
vw-sublinks/FE3C992C78838853802577DF0071D796?openDocument [https://perma.cc/
E5KZ-QG47]. 
154. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
155. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765–66 (2014).
156. See id. at 2772. 




161. See id. at 2769–71. 
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1
acts that are “engaged in for religious reasons.” 162F 162 The two for-profit
corporations made money from engaging in business practices that were 
meant to honor God.163F 163 In deciding that the for-profit corporations were
exempt from the Contraceptive Mandate, the Court did not require the 
corporations prove they resembled a religion.164F 164 
Although the facts of Hobby Lobby and Real Alternatives are different,
the Court’s reasoning from Hobby Lobby is still instructive. Similar to the 
government’s argument in Hobby Lobby that the for-profit corporations
did not exercise religion because they had profit-making objectives, 165F 165 the
court in Real Alternatives found a problem with the fact that Real Alternative’s 
main purpose was to implement programs that reflected its opposition to 
contraceptives and abortion.16F 166 
Yet, despite the for-profit corporation’s profit-making objectives, the 
Court in Hobby Lobby concluded that the corporations did exercise religion.167F 167 
The Court recognized that Hobby Lobby was a nationwide arts and crafts
chain that operated according to Christian principles.168F 168 Among other things,
this meant that it closed its stores on Sundays and donated a portion of its
profits to Christian ministries and missionaries.169F 169  The Court reasoned that
the exercise of religion included participating in physical acts for religious
170reasons. 170F 
The substance rather than the form of an organization should be scrutinized 
in cases involving nonreligious organizations looking to be exempt from 
the Contraceptive Mandate. Unlike the court in Real Alternatives, the court 
in March for Life did not require that March for Life prove it resembled a 
religion.71F 171 The court recognized that March for Life had a sincerely held
belief opposing abortion.172F 172 The form of the organization and the purpose
of the organization was never brought into question by the court.173F 173 
162. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). In this case, the plaintiffs filed
for unemployment benefits, but the state refused to administer them to the plaintiffs because 
they used peyote, an illegal drug in Oregon.  Id. at 874.  The majority ruled against the plaintiffs 
using a newly-created neutrality test.  See id. at 883–84.  The Court reasoned that because 
the Oregon law was generally applicable and did not specifically target religion, the law 
was not unconstitutional. Id. at 890. 
163. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766. 
164.  See generally id. at 2759–85. 
165. Id. at 2759–60. 
166. Real Alts., Inc. v. Sec’y HHS, 867 F.3d 338, 349 (3d Cir. 2017). 
167.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771, 2775. 
168. Id. at 2765–66. 
169. Id. at 2766. 
170. See id. at 2770. 
171. See generally March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. 2015).
172.  Id. at 127. 
173. See generally March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116. 
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Real Alternatives resembles a religion in the same way a religious 
organization afforded an exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate does. 
Like religious organizations, nonreligious organizations are often created 
to reflect a specific belief. They often act as supplements to religion rather 
than replacements. Real Alternatives implements programs because of its
sincere belief that life begins at conception, which is no different from religious
organizations that the government exempts from the Contraceptive 
Mandate. 174 Religious organizations participate and implement certain1 7 4 F 
practices and programs because of their religious belief. And like nonreligious 
organizations, religious organizations do not literally resemble a religion.
Accordingly, it would be contrary to Supreme Court precedent to require that
nonreligious organizations resemble a religion or be a comprehensive belief
system before the government treats them the same as their religious
counterparts. 
2. Religious and Nonreligious Organizations Are Similarly Situated 
The equal protection provision of the Fifth Amendment ensures that “all 
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”175F 175 Although the phrase
“similarly situated” is not a part of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution,176F 176 
the phrase is a common component of equal protection case law.17F 177 Although
the meaning of similarly situated in the context of equal protection appears
easy to define, its definition is not as intuitive as it seems.178F 178 At first glance,
similarly situated seems to mean that everyone in the class of people a law 
174. For various courts’ holdings concerning religious beliefs and discrimination,
see generally Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 869 (7th
Cir. 2014); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Lown v. Salvation
Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
175. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (stating that those 
“similarly circumstanced” should be treated similarly).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
177. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 581, 581 (2011). The idea of being “similarly situated” was first addressed
by the Supreme Court in an 1884 equal protection case involving an ordinance targeting
laundries run by Chinese immigrants. Id. at 583 (citing Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 
32 (1884)).
178. Although frequently invoked in the equal protection context, the concept of 
similarly situated is not always employed by courts. Shay, supra note 177, at 586. Notable
equal protection cases like United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), and Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996), lack a similarly situated analysis. Shay, supra note 177, at 586. 
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is trying to protect possesses a singular classifying trait. 179F 179 However, 
Professors Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek argued in an influential
1949 Article that the purpose of the statute is what determines whether
two things are similarly situated.180F 180 Thus, the question to ask for purposes
of this Comment is not whether nonreligious organizations are similarly
situated to religious organizations because they look like churches and act 
like churches, but rather, given the purpose of the exemption to the 
Contraceptive Mandate, whether religious organizations and nonreligious
are similarly situated. 
Consequently, in the context of the Contraceptive Mandate, nonreligious
organizations are similarly situated to religious organizations for two reasons.
First, the HHS’s stated purpose in creating a religious exemption to the 
Contraceptive Mandate also was broad enough to justify exempting nonreligious
organizations. Second, the underlying reasons of why religion is generally
protected also justify exempting nonreligious organizations. In addition, 
relative to the purpose of the religious exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate,
the similarities, and not the dissimilarities, between religious and nonreligious
organizations matter in determining whether the organizations are similarly
situated. 
a. HHS’s Stated Purpose in Creating a Religious Exemption
Justifies the Extension of Such an Exemption to 
Nonreligious Organizations 
According to the HHS, the purpose of the Contraceptive Mandate was 
to provide contraceptive coverage “to individuals who want it.” 81F 181 The
HHS created a religious exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate because
of the “unique relationship between a house of worship and its employees.”182F 182 
In creating the exemption, the HHS clearly stated the mandate’s purpose.
The HHS stated that the unique relationship referred to the fact that “houses
of worship and their integrated auxiliaries” are less likely than other groups
to want contraceptives and more likely to employ people who share the same
179. Shay, supra note 177, at 587 (citing Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 345 (1949)).
180. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 179, at 346. 
181. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventative Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
8725, 8727 (Feb. 15, 2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 
147).
182. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventative Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 
46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 147). 
814
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objection, and would thus be less likely to even want contraceptives. 183F 183 
As a result, through the religious exemption, the HHS wanted to protect 
individuals that it believed are less likely than other individual to want
contraceptives. Further, although the HHS claimed to be protecting religious
beliefs when it promulgated an interim final rule that only included a religious
exemption, it actually meant to protect all employers that had beliefs, religious 
or moral, regarding the sanctity of human life. Although the court in March 
for Life recognized this conclusion, the court in Real Alternatives did not.
The main reason for this difference stems from the Real Alternatives
court’s incorrect analysis of what it means to be similarly situated. Unlike 
the court in March for Life, the court in Real Alternatives dictated its similarly
situated analysis by asking whether nonreligious organizations are similarly
situated to religious organizations. However, the question the court should
have asked and answered was: given the purpose of the exemption to the
Contraceptive Mandate, whether religious organizations and nonreligious 
are similarly situated. Had it done so, it would have answered in the affirmative 
because Real Alternatives was a nonreligious organization that considered 
the use of contraceptives to be morally wrong, so it opposed the use of all
contraception and only hired employees who shared in its belief. It held 
its belief so strongly that its main purpose for existence was to provide pregnancy
services, parenting support, and abstinence education programs. Thus, Real
Alternatives, though a nonreligious organization, fits the type of organization 
the HHS intended to exempt from the Contraceptive Mandate. Because 
of this, prohibiting an exemption for nonreligious organizations like Real
Alternatives violates their right to equal protection.
b. The Underlying Reasons Justifying the Protection of Religious Beliefs 
Also Justify the Protection of Nonreligious Beliefs 
In addition, although it may be true that the HHS’s stated reason for creating 
the religious exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate was to protect 
individuals that it believed were less likely than other individual to want 
contraceptives, the HHS also likely created the exemption to protect religion. 
Though historically it was viewed that protecting religion meant protecting
183. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,887 (July 2, 2013) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510 
& 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 147 & 156). 
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what people perceived as their duty to God,184F 184 today protecting religion
can mean respecting sincere beliefs that may or may not include a relationship
with a higher being.185F 185 Additionally, although there are many reasons
why religion is protected, this section will only mention two. 
1. A Moral Exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate Should Protect 
Nonreligious Organizations’ Sincerely Held Beliefs 
The first reason for protecting religion is that individuals feel that their 
obligations to their religious beliefs outweigh their obligations to the 
government.186F 186  In other words, many individuals hold their religious beliefs
deeply, and if they were put in a situation to choose between their obligations
to the government and their respective religions, they would choose the 
latter. Hence, governments should make an effort not to interfere with an 
individual’s religious belief. If this is a possible reason the HHS created
the religious exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate, then it is reasonable 
to conclude the government should also exempt nonreligious organizations 
with sincerely held beliefs regarding the use of contraceptives from the 
mandate.  Like religious beliefs, moral beliefs play an important role in
peoples’ and organizations’ lives. It is obvious that if put in a situation 
to choose between their moral obligation and their obligations to the
government, people and organizations would choose the latter. That is in 
184. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1497 (1990). 
185. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional 
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 204 (1991).  Professor Smith argues that the decline in 
constitutional commitment to religious freedom is due to the fact that the commitment to 
religious freedom contains a self-cancellation element to it.  See id. at 149.  Smith states 
that the self-cancellation stems from the relationship between the historical justification of 
religious freedom and the current interpretation of religious freedom.  Id.  Historically, the 
justification of religious freedom has been that an individual’s religious duties or obligations 
are more important to the individual than his or her other duties, so the government should 
not interfere with religion.  Id. at 154–55.  Additionally, religious freedom is currently interpreted 
as forbidding the government from relying on religious justifications for public policies or 
decisions.  Id. at 181.  According to Smith, both the historical justification of religious freedom 
and the current interpretation of religious freedom prevents judges and legal scholars from 
being able to apply the Constitution’s commitment to religious freedom in a coherent and 
uniform way.  See id. at 149–150. 
186. See 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE 
AND FAIRNESS 400–01 (2006).  Some legal scholars state that religious beliefs “are strong 
because they are deeply embedded in the person’s self.”  Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General 
Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 N.W. U. L. REV. 1113, 1165 (1988).  Because of 
this, they believe that religion should be afforded a special protection.  Id. at 1166.  However, 
some qualify that argument by also stating that there is practically no difference in protecting 
religious or moral beliefs that are essential to an individual’s self-identity.  See, e.g., William P. 
Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 
IND. L. J. 351, 361 n.56 (1991) (citing Conkle, supra, at 1165–66). 
816
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fact what Real Alternatives and March for Life did. Both nonreligious
organizations had sincerely held beliefs regarding contraceptives, and despite
the government mandate to provide employees with coverage, they chose 
not to.
A second reason commonly given for protecting religion relates to 
personal autonomy.187F 187  The argument is that individuals should be free to
practice their religious beliefs. Therefore, the government should not try
to control people, their beliefs, and the actions that result from their beliefs. 
Again, this is a possible reason the HHS created the religious exemption
to the Contraceptive Mandate, then it is also reasonable to conclude that 
the government should exempt nonreligious organizations with sincerely
held beliefs regarding the use of contraceptives from the mandate.  If
individuals should be free to practice their religious beliefs without government 
interference, then individuals and organizations should be free to practice 
their moral beliefs without government interference as well. This is especially
true in light of the fact that the percentage of Americans who do not consider 
themselves religious has been rising.18F 188 Thus, the government should not
force nonreligious organizations like Real Alternatives and March for Life
that have moral objections to the Contraceptive Mandate to give up their
moral beliefs and the choices that result from those beliefs just because it
says so. 
c. The Similarities Between Religious and Nonreligious Organizations 
Matter in Determining Whether the Organizations Are 
Similarly Situated 
The substance rather than the form of an organization should be scrutinized 
in cases involving nonreligious organizations looking to be exempt from 
187. 1 GREENAWALT, supra note 186, at 401. Legal scholars such as John Garvey have 
criticized the legitimacy of the personal autonomy rationale.  See John H. Garvey, Free 
Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779, 791 (1986).  For 
example, Garvey argues that religious or even sincerely held beliefs may not be the only 
type of beliefs that are important to an individual’s self identity.  See id.  Garvey posed the 
question: if an individual claims wearing a cowboy hat is essential to his or her identity or 
“conception of self,” should that individual be given the same amount of protection as an 
individual who claims that religion makes up his or her identity?  Id. 
188. Michael Lipka, A Closer Look at America’s Rapidly Growing Religious ‘Nones,’
PEW RES. CTR. (May 13, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/13/a-closer-
look-at-americas-rapidly-growing-religious-nones/ [https://perma.cc/QHM8-YJ9G].
817
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the Contraceptive Mandate.189F 189 In many cases, organizations appear different
because they are in fact different. Their structural forms, the activities they
participate in, and the programs they choose to implement are dissimilar.
For example, there are obvious differences between a church and a religious
organization such as Samaritan’s Purse. Although one would expect a
church to hold weekly sermons and prayer meetings led by a pastor, one 
would not expect that from an organization such as Samaritan’s Purse.
Instead, Samaritan’s Purse implements programs such as Operation Christmas 
Child that sends toys to families in need worldwide. 190F 190 The main purpose
of a church is to cater to the spiritual needs of the community it is located 
in, and the main purpose of global religious organizations is often to provide
resources and basic services, which are often not spiritual to those who 
are in need. 91F 191 Despite the differences, both organizations are considered 
to be religious and exempt from the Contraceptive Mandate. The religious 
exemption focuses on the similarities of the organizations and not on the
dissimilarities. The same should apply to nonreligious organizations. 
Like religious organizations, nonreligious organizations are often created 
to reflect a specific belief. For instance, Real Alternatives implements 
programs because of its sincere belief that life begins at conception.192F 192  This
is no different from religious organizations, which the government gives 
an exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate.193F 193 Religious organizations
participate and implement certain practices and programs because of their
religious belief. Nonreligious organizations participate and implement
certain practices and programs because of their sincerely held belief. The
fact that one belief is religious and the other is not should not result in
different treatment, especially if the beliefs are identical. Assuming that 
protecting religion means respecting sincerely held beliefs regardless of
belief in a higher being, then differences in structure and activities should
not matter in deciding whether an organization should be exempt from the 
Contraceptive Mandate. 
189. See discussion supra Section IV.A.1.a.2.
190. See generally The Amazing Journey of a Simple Shoebox Gift, SAMARITAN’S 
PURSE, https://www.samaritanspurse.org/operation-christmas-child/the-journey-of-a-shoebox/
[https://perma.cc/A74A-GYU8].
191. See generally Joanne Fritz, What Is the Difference Between a Church and a
Religious Organization?, BALANCE SMALL BUS. (June 25, 2019), https://www.thebalancesmb. 
com/church-vs-religious-organization-2501877 [https://perma.cc/5SRL-4JW8]. 
192. Real Alts., Inc. v. Sec’y HHS, 867 F.3d 338, 368 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., 
concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
193. For analysis on religious exemptions granted by federal courts, see generally
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014); McClure 
v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Lown v. Salvation Army, 393 F. Supp.
2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
818
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3. The Contraceptive Mandate with Only a Religious Exemption 
Does Not Pass a Rational Basis Review 
The Supreme Court has applied equal protection principles to the federal 
government under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 194F 194 
Usually, the Court makes a determination of the appropriate standard of 
review it will apply to the challenged statute. The Court can apply three 
standards: rational basis scrutiny, 195F 195 intermediate scrutiny, 196F 196 and strict 
scrutiny.197F 197 Each level of scrutiny entails a specific test with increasingly
demanding requirements that must be satisfied if the challenged statute is 
to survive constitutional challenge. 
The level of scrutiny that applies is important because if the statute is
subject to strict scrutiny, the government will have to prove that the policy 
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.198F 198 That is a much 
194. See generally Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). There has been a history 
of controversy over what is included in substantive due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See, e.g., G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes’s 
Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 88–89 (1997).  In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, the Supreme
Court invalidated a state law on substantive due process grounds for the first time.  165 
U.S. 578, 593 (1897). This began what scholars call the Lochner Era, in which the Supreme
Court invalidated several laws on substantive due process grounds. See generally Bernstein,
supra note 59, at 1261–69. In Lochner v. New York, New York passed a law that restricted 
work in bakeries to sixty hours a week. See 198 U.S. 45, 45–46 (1905).  Lochner, an owner of
a bakery, sued the state and argued that the law burdened his right to contract, which was 
protected by substantive due process.  See id. at 52–53.  The state argued that the law was 
meant to protect public health and safety and so it was not unconstitutional. See id. at 51.
However, the Court sided with the plaintiff because it did not believe there was a reasonable
argument for the hour restriction. Id. at 64–65. The Lochner Era seem to have ended when
Court decided Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). In that case, the Court upheld a statute 
which fixed the price of milk on the basis that the law was not unreasonable and that the
state seemingly had a legitimate reason for the law. Id. at 504, 539. 
195. E.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“In areas of
social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect 
lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational 
basis for the classification.”).
196. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“To withstand intermediate 
scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially related to an important governmental 
objective.”).
197. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(Courts will uphold laws subjected to the strict scrutiny standard “if they are suitably tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest.” (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964))). 
198. E.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (stating that because 
the town imposed content-based restrictions on speech through its code, the Court would
819
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higher standard than rational basis, which only requires a legitimate 
government interest. 19F 199  Thus, it will be harder for the government to win 
a case if the Court interprets the statute under strict scrutiny.20F 200 Therefore,
it follows that claimants will argue a statute should be subject to strict
scrutiny, and the government will try to argue a statute should be subject
to rational basis review.201 However, in most cases strict scrutiny only applies
to statutes dealing with race and national origin.02F 202 Intermediate scrutiny
applies to gender discrimination cases.203F 203 And rational basis review applies
to cases dealing with most other classifications. Rational basis review applies
to laws that do not burden a fundamental right or target a suspect class. 204F 204 
This means that to overcome an equal protection challenge, the statute
must rationally relate to a legitimate governmental purpose.205F 205 
As a result, religion falls under rational basis review. Additionally, the 
plaintiffs in both March for Life and Real Alternatives do not dispute 
this.206F 206 However, they do dispute whether the ACA with only the religious 
uphold the specific provisions if they passed strict scrutiny, “which requires the Government to
prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve 
that interest” (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010))).
199. See Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313–14. 
200. The rational basis standard confers “a strong presumption of validity” on a
challenged statute. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). The government has “no
obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality” of the challenged statute. Id. at
320. Instead, a plaintiff challenging the statute must “negative every conceivable basis
which might support it.”  Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 
(1973) (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)).
201. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and Desirable), 
14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 402, 410 (2016).  Some scholars such as Erwin Chemerinsky 
argue that the rational basis standard is a form of review that is “almost empty” and 
“enormously deferential.”  Id.  However, in rare circumstances, a court may strike down a 
challenged statute even though rational basis applies, and strict scrutiny does not, if the 
court speculates animus.  Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2018).
202. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by 
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a 
highly suspect tool.”). 
203. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720, 733 (1982) (applying
strict scrutiny in striking down the single-sex admissions policy of a state-funded nursing
school); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191–92, 210 (1976) (striking down an Oklahoma 
statute that prohibited the sale of ‘“nonintoxicating’ 3.2% beer to males under the age of 
21 and to females under the age of 18” under intermediate scrutiny). 
204. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313. 
205. See id.
206. Real Alts., Inc. v. Sec’y HHS, 867 F.3d 338, 348 (3d Cir. 2017); March for Life
v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 125–26 (D.D.C. 2015). 
820
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exemption passes a rational basis review.207F 207 This section argues that it does
not. 
Under a rational basis review, a court gives the government a lot of 
deference in providing some explanation of a legitimate purpose  for  a
statute. 208F 208 For example, a statute that is underinclusive and overinclusive
is acceptable under a rational basis review. 209F 209 Even if the government
does not articulate a legitimate reason for the statute, the statute can still
pass a rational basis review so long as the court can come up with a legitimate 
reason after the fact.210F 210 However, a statute does not pass a rational basis
review if there is no conceivable reason for the difference in treatment created 
by the statute.21F 211 
The court in March for Life argues that the HHS had no legitimate reason
for the difference in treatment regarding nonreligious organizations and
religious organizations.12F 212 In contrast, the court in Real Alternatives reasoned
that the HHS does have a legitimate reason because there has historically
been respect for the autonomy of religion.213F 213  The court also relied on the
holding from United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz to hold 
that the religious exemption can still pass a rational basis review even if the
government did not state a legitimate reason for treating nonreligious and 
religious organizations differently.214F 214 
In Fritz, Congress passed a statute that eliminated certain railroad employees’
benefits depending on their employment history.215F 215 The statute divided the
employees into different classes based on their employment history and gave
out benefits accordingly.216F 216 A group of plaintiffs sued the Railroad Retirement
207. Compare Real Alts., Inc., 867 F.3d at 353, with March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 
134. 
208. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (stating that under the rational
basis standard, courts give “a strong presumption of validity” in regard to a challenged statute.). 
209. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955). In
this case, the Court held that an Oklahoma law that allowed only doctors to fix the frames 
of glasses was constitutional.  Id. at 485, 487–88.  Although the law created a lot of administrative 
waste, the legislature may have concluded that the law was meant to help promote the public 
good.  Id. at 487.  The Court reasoned that a law that creates waste is not automatically 
unreasonable; the law must only be minimally rational.  See id. at 491. 
210. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
211. See id.
212. See March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 125. 
213. See Real Alts., Inc. v. Sec’y HHS, 867 F.3d 338, 350 (3d Cir. 2017). 
214. Id. at 351–52. 
215. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 171–72. 
216. See id.
821
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Board alleging the statute treated them differently from other employees,
which violated the Due Process Clause.217F 217 The district court held the statute
did not pass rational basis review because it was unclear whether the
government had a reason for dividing the employees in the first place. 218F 218 
However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s holding, stating that
the statute passed rational basis review because one could reasonably conceive 
that the government divided the employees into different groups to ensure
the solvency of the entire retirement system. 219F 219 
The HHS does not allow nonreligious organizations like March for Life 
and Real Alternatives that are against the use of certain contraceptives to
claim the exemption. The HHS justifies this distinction through a historically
recognized respect for the autonomy of religion. This fails for two reasons.
First, the underlying reasons justifying the protection of religious beliefs 
also justify the protection of nonreligious beliefs.20F 220 Protecting religion can 
mean respecting sincere beliefs that may or may not include a relationship 
with a higher being. Religion is protected for two common reasons: individuals 
feel that their obligations to their beliefs outweigh their obligations to the
government21F 221 and individuals value their personal autonomy.2F 222 In the
case of Real Alternatives, its loyalty to its moral beliefs is more important
than its obligation to the government.  So important, that it was willing to 
forgo complying with a mandated provision.  Additionally, Real Alternatives’ 
sincerely held belief that abortion is wrong promotes personal autonomy. 
If the government allows organizations to freely practice their religious 
beliefs, why should it not allow organizations that hold moral beliefs to 
do the same. 
Second, as previously argued, in creating a religious exemption, the HHS
wanted to protect individuals that it believed are less likely than other 
individuals to want contraceptives.23F 223 If this is true, then it seems like there
is no conceivable reason for the difference in treatment between nonreligious
217. See id. at 173. 
218. See id. at 174. 
219. See id. at 168–69, 179–80. All of the payroll taxes and other earmarked incomes
are deposited in the Social Security trust fund. Policy Basics: Understanding the Social Security
Trust Funds, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-
security/policy-basics-understanding-the-social-security-trust-funds [https://perma.cc/2257-
T8RG] (last updated July 23, 2018). Additionally, Social Security is a pay-as-you-go system. 
Id. This means that the benefits beneficiaries are currently receiving are funded by the payroll
taxes collected from people working today. Id. However, reports predict the Social Security
trust fund is expected to be completely depleted in 2034. Id. In recent years, there is more
money leaving the trust fund than being deposited into it. Id.
220. See discussion supra Section IV.A.2.b.
221. See, e.g., 1 GREENAWALT, supra note 186, at 400–01. 
222. See, e.g., id.
223. See discussion supra Section IV.A.2.a.
822
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organizations and religious organizations. In that sense, the application
of United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz in the Real Alternatives
case seems misplaced because, although rational basis review does not
require the government to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, there 
still must be a conceivable reason for the difference in treatment created
by the statute.24F 224 
In Fritz, the conceivable reason for the difference in treatment was ensuring
the solvency of the entire retirement system. 25F 225  In March for Life and Real
Alternatives, the HHS claimed the conceivable reason for the difference
in treatment was the historical respect for the autonomy of religion.26F 226 
However, unlike in Fritz, the HHS’s own statements regarding the purpose
of the religious exemption negated its conceivable reason. Therefore, the 
difference in treatment regarding nonreligious organizations and religious
organizations by the religious exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate 
does not pass rational basis review. 
V. SOLUTION
Revisiting the dichotomy from the hypothetical presented at the start of
this Comment, courts should and must protect nonreligious organizations’ 
rights to exempt themselves from the Contraceptive Mandate, even if it
goes against popular belief. Courts are split on whether the government should
give an exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate to a nonreligious organization 
that has the same views about contraception as a religious organization 
does.27F 227 The lower courts have been unable to agree on whether the exclusion 
of a moral exemption for the Contraceptive Mandate violates the Equal
Protection Clause in the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, courts cannot look
to the Supreme Court for an answer because it has not yet directly addressed 
the issue. This lack of conformity is troubling because it appears that the 
protection of a nonreligious organization’s right to equal protection depends 
on the court the nonreligious organization files suit in. Thus, this Comment 
proposes a uniform factor test that courts can use when specifically confronted 
with a case alleging an equal protection violation regarding the exemption 
224. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
225.  449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980).
226. See discussion supra Part III. 
227. See Real Alts., Inc. v. Sec’y HHS, 867 F.3d 338, 348 (3d Cir. 2017); March for
Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 127 (D.D.C. 2015). 
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to the Contraceptive Mandate. 28228 This solution specifically proposes a F 
factor test courts can use to help courts identify a deeply and sincerely
held belief. 29F 229
A. Uniform Factor Test to Identify a Sincerely Held Belief
In Welsh and Seeger, the Supreme Court expanded the legal definition 
of “religious” to include secular, but nevertheless deeply held, ethical and
moral beliefs.230230 This resulted in giving equal treatment to nonreligious F 
individuals.  Likewise, the substance rather than the form of an organization 
should be scrutinized in the identification of a sincerely held belief.  Courts 
should take into consideration three factors: (1) the activities, events, 
and programs the organization is a part of; (2) whether the organization 
is made up of a group of like-minded individuals who have the desire to 
further the organization’s mission; and (3) the level of time commitment 
an organization has for its sincerely held belief.  This factor test is meant 
to be broad enough to include nonreligious organizations such as March 
for Life and Real Alternatives but not broad enough to include organizations 
that obviously do not have a sincerely held belief about not using
contraceptives.
In analyzing an organization under the first factor, courts should look 
to the substance rather than the form of the organization. Courts can look 
at the kinds of activities and programs an organization is a part of.  Presumably,
an organization with sincere beliefs regarding the use of contraceptives
will organize events or programs that reflect its belief. For example, March
228. Although Congress could resolve the split by drafting a statute that clarifies the
Contraceptive Mandate, passage of such a statute would be difficult in today’s political 
climate. Even if a moral exemption clause was successfully added to the Contraceptive 
Mandate, the Mandate will still likely continue to be one of the most heavily litigated topics
relating to the ACA. See Amanda Michelle Gomez, Trump’s Rollback of Birth Control
Mandate Could Go Into Effect Next Week Unless Courts Block It, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 
10, 2019, 8:21 AM), https://thinkprogress.org/trumps-rollback-of-birth-control-mandate-
could-go-into-effect-next-week-unless-courts-block-it/ [https://perma.cc/A83G-R5CZ].
In November 2018, the Trump Administration introduced a set of final rules that included 
a moral exemption clause.  See id.  The rules are set to go in effect on January 14, 2019, but are 
already being challenged.  See id.  Democrat-led states have already filed suit in federal district 
court. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 560 (E.D. Pa. 2017), aff’d, 
Nos. 17-3752, 18-1253, 19-1129 & 19-1189, 2019 WL 3057657 (3d Cir. July 12, 2019), amended 
in part by Nos. 17-3572, 18-1253, 19-1129 & 19-1189, 2019 WL 3228336 (3d Cir. July 
18, 2019) (mem.).  Accordingly, this Comment proposes a way in which courts can resolve 
the legal disputes without amending the Contraceptive Mandate or issuing a new set of 
rules—actions that will only lead to more lawsuits. 
229. See discussion supra Section IV.A.1.a.1.
230. See supra notes 118–31 and accompanying text.
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for Life puts on an annual pro-life conference and demonstration in
231 Washington, D.C. 231F  It often invites speakers who are pro-life.232F  32
In analyzing an organization under the second factor, courts must ask
whether the organization is made up of a group of like-minded individuals 
who have the desire to further the organization’s mission. This factor 
is meant to ensure that an exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate is only
given to the organizations the HHS intended.23F 233 For example, the government
should not afford an exemption to the Contraceptive Mandate to a 
nonreligious organization whose director is personally against the use of
contraceptives and consequently does not want to give any of the employees
contraceptives. The HHS created a religious exemption for organizations 
that are less likely than other organizations to want contraceptives and
more likely to employ people who share the same objection and would 
thus be less likely to even want contraceptives. 234F 234  Additionally, the HHS
created the exemption to respect sincere beliefs because organizations feel 
that their obligations to their beliefs outweigh their obligations to the 
government, and they value their personal autonomy.235 To allow an exemption235F 
for a nonreligious organization just because its director or board of directors
are personally opposed to the use of certain contraceptives goes against 
the HHS’s purpose in creating the exemption. A court should not take the
director or the board of directors’ personal beliefs into consideration if they
have nothing to do with the purpose of the organization.
Finally, in analyzing an organization under the third factor, courts must 
look at the level of time commitment an organization commits to its sincerely
held belief. This factor is meant to separate those organizations with actual
sincere beliefs regarding contraceptives from those with shallow beliefs.
A nonreligious organization with a sincere belief against the use of certain
contraceptives will spend a good amount of time participating and organizing 
events that reflect its belief. Accordingly, courts should consider a nonreligious
organization that exhibits the necessary characteristics for each of the three 
factors to have a sincerely held belief and should not for an organization that
does not exhibit such characteristics. 
231. About the March for Life, supra note 5.
232. See 46th Annual March for Life, MARCH FOR LIFE, http://marchforlife.org/mfl-
2019/rally-march-info/ [https://perma.cc/PV3D-HRZ6].
233. See discussion supra Section IV.A.2.a.
234. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
235. See discussion supra Section II.C.1.
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For example, applying the factor test to a nonreligious organization 
such as the Heritage Foundation leads to the conclusion that it would not
have the necessary sincerely held belief to be exempt from the Contraceptive
Mandate. The Heritage Foundation is a conservative think tank that wants
“to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on principles 
of free enterprise, limited government, [and] individual freedom.”236F 236 It is
known for advocating a right-wing agenda. 237F 237 
Analyzing the Heritage Foundation under the first factor, the factor does 
not weigh in favor of giving the organization an exemption.  Presumably, an 
organization with a sincere belief regarding the use of contraceptives will 
organize events or programs that reflect its belief. However, unlike March
for Life and Real Alternatives, the extent of the Heritage Foundation’s pro-
life activities is limited to writing and publishing a few reports indicating 
its stance on the funding of abortion.238F 238 The Heritage Foundation was not
created on the basis of promoting pro-life principles. The second factor 
also does not weigh in favor of giving the organization an exemption because 
it cannot be said that the Heritage Foundation only hires employees who 
believe that the use of certain contraceptives and abortion are morally wrong.239 F 
Although the organization may require employees to support its mission 
and vision for America,24F 0  240 a vision of  “an America where freedom, opportunity, 
239
prosperity, and civil society flourish”241F 241 is very broad and arguably does not 
require a belief that the use of certain contraceptives and abortion is morally
wrong. The purpose of the Heritage Foundation goes beyond opposing 
abortion; in fact, that may not even be an important issue for the organization. 
Finally, the third factor also does not weigh in favor of providing the
organization with an exemption because, although it is reasonable to assume
that it spends some time advocating for pro-life policies, it is just as reasonable 
to assume it spends a majority of its time advocating for other conservative
public policies that have nothing to do with having a sincerely held belief 
that the use of certain contraceptives is morally wrong. 
236. About Heritage, HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/about-heritage/mission 
[https://perma.cc/8W2X-PPVC]. 
237. See Jonathan Mahler, How One Conservative Think Tank Is Stocking Trump’s 
Government, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/
magazine/trump-government-heritage-foundation-think-tank.html [https://perma.cc/URR5-
N9GA].
238. See, e.g., THOMAS M. MESSNER & EDMUND F. HAISLMAIER, THE RICHARD & HELEN
DEVOS CTR. FOR  RELIGION & CIVIL SOC’Y, ON CONTRACEPTION MANDATE, THE  OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION’S POTENTIAL PROPOSED “ACCOMMODATION” FAILS TO PROTECT RELIGIOUS
AND MORAL CONSCIENCE 1 (2012), https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/SR112.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/86BK-FNHK].
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In contrast, applying the factor test to March for Life and Real Alternatives, 
leads to the conclusion that both organizations have sincerely held beliefs.
First, March for Life puts on an annual pro-life conference and demonstration 
in Washington, D.C.,42F 242 and Real Alternatives provided pregnancy services,
parenting support, and abstinence education programs to women and
families. 243F 243 Second, both March for Life and Real Alternatives only hired
employees who shared the organization’s belief that the use of certain
contraceptives and abortion is morally wrong.24F 244  Third, although the exact 
amount of time both organizations spend on their sincerely held belief 
that the use of certain contraceptives and abortion is morally wrong is 
undeterminable, it is reasonable to assume that they spend a majority of their 
time because they were both created as organizations meant to promote
pro-life ideals. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The exclusion of a moral exemption for the Contraceptive Mandate 
violates the equal protection provision in the Fifth Amendment for three 
reasons. First, legislation and courts should not treat religious organizations
differently than nonreligious organizations because there is evidence that
the protection of religion serves as a proxy to protect nonreligious interests. 
Additionally, prominent court cases suggest that the Supreme Court recognizes
such a proxy. Second, nonreligious organizations are similarly situated to
religious organizations when it comes to the exemption to the Contraceptive
Mandate because the HHS’s stated purpose in creating a religious exemption
justifies the extension of such an exemption to nonreligious organizations, 
and the underlying reasons justifying the protection of religious beliefs 
also justify the protection of nonreligious beliefs. And third, the HHS does
not have a rational basis in treating religious organizations differently from 
nonreligious organizations because the HHS’s own statements regarding
the purpose of the religious exemption negate any conceivable reason for 
dissimilar treatment.
242. About the March for Life, supra note 5.
243. Real Alts., Inc. v. Sec’y HHS, 867 F.3d 338, 345 (3d Cir. 2017). 
244. See id. at 346; March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 123 (D.D.C. 2015). 
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Despite the controversy that has ensued over exemptions to the Contraceptive 
Mandate,245F 245 there is much more at stake than just prohibiting an exemption
for nonreligious organizations. Prohibiting an exemption for nonreligious 
organizations means accepting that moral beliefs do not play the same
important role in people’s and organization’s lives as religious beliefs.
This creates a risky precedent that if something is unpopular, the courts 
are willing to relinquish equal protection and accept unequal treatment
between two groups.246F 246 
Courts may soon resolve the fate of the moral exemption to the Contraceptive 
Mandate. Following the argument put forward in this Comment, future 
courts that hear challenges to the exemption should be open to a more
expansive protection of religion, which at times may include nonreligion.
Though the exemption will slightly reduce the availability of employer-
provided contraception, the benefit of this exemption is that it will preserve
the governmental practice of not favoring one group over another.  This
is important because such protections will ensure that the federal government 
treats two employers like Employer A and Employer B, which have the
same views about contraception but base their beliefs in different entities 
or sources, equally.
245. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Rebecca R. Ruiz & Laurie Goodstein, Trump Administration 
Rolls Back Birth Control Mandate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/10/06/us/politics/trump-contraception-birth-control.html [https://perma.cc/P4ML-P6N5].
246. See Samantha Schmidt, Trump Administration Set to Expand Religious Exemptions
to Birth Control Coverage, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
religion/2018/10/19/trump-administration-set-expand-religious-exemptions-birth-control-
coverage [https://perma.cc/LJ37-9BHL].
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